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THESIS

**AN EMERGING SECURITY COMMUNITY IN THE
AMERICAS?: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE POST-COLD WAR INTER-
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME**

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March 2003

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WAR INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME**

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the actual and potential consequences of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world. This thesis has three major arguments. First, the inter-American democracy regime “matters” because it can positively impact state and individual behavior in the post-Cold War inter-American system. Second, the three principles that constitute this regime (democracy, interdependence, and international organizations) are mutually reinforcing in perpetuating the “community of democracies” in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, this inter-American “community of democracies” is plausibly on a path to a pluralistic security community based on the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. This thesis places the actual and potential consequences of this regime into a broader, systemic context. This thesis critically examines two high-profile cases of democratic crisis, Paraguay (1996) and Peru (2000) to assess the actual impact of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. These research findings are later extrapolated to assess the potential impact of this regime in the post-Cold War inter-American system. In short, this thesis concludes that, in the post-Cold War world, the Western Hemisphere is evidence of a liberal, qualitative peace.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE INTER-AMERICAN “COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES”

The Western Hemisphere begins the twenty-first century with a “near-universal embrace of democracy.”¹ Democracy currently prevails in every country throughout the hemisphere, with the obvious exception of Cuba. “Increasingly, the member states of the hemisphere are presenting themselves as a single democratic community, committed to safeguarding and consolidating democratic regimes throughout the region.”²

This inter-American community of democracies is comparable to the North Atlantic community of democracies in three specific ways: (1) its political systems are democratic; (2) its economies are increasingly free market-oriented; and (3) disputes between its nations are generally settled by negotiation or arbitration.³ In fact, these three principles have become so internalized throughout the hemisphere that at the most recent Summit of the Americas meeting in April 2001 in Quebec, President George W. Bush proudly proclaimed that the Americas had a great collective vision: “A fully democratic hemisphere bound together by goodwill and free trade.”⁴ Later in the same speech the President added, “that’s a tall order. It’s a chance of a lifetime. This is not the time to grow timid or weary. We will inspire the world by our example.”⁵ These three principles are also addressed in the most recent National Security Strategy of the United States:

Together we will promote a truly democratic hemisphere where our integration advances security, prosperity, opportunity, and hope. We will work with regional institutions, such as the Summit of the Americas

¹ Forrest D. Colburn, *Latin America at the End of Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 3.

² Larry Diamond, “Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation,” in Tom Farer, ed., pp. 52-104, *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 52.

³ Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 83.

⁴ Nahlah Ayed, “Leaders Agree on Democracy Clause,” *National Post Online*, April 21, 2001, [<http://www.nationalpost.com/features/summit2001/20010421story5.html>], p. 2, Accessed January 21, 2002.

⁵ Ibid. Emphasis Mine.

process, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Defense Ministerial of the Americas for the benefit of the entire hemisphere.⁶

B. THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME

These three principles constitute the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. First, as noted earlier, most of the nations in the Western Hemisphere have become democracies. Second, with respect to free-market economics, globalization has resulted in a more integrated and interdependent hemisphere. At present, integration and interdependence is limited to subregional groupings such as MERCOSUR and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Nevertheless, even these limited agreements “have increased the links of economic, social, and even political interdependence among the countries of the region.”⁷ Furthermore, the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) represents an ambitious goal for increased economic integration and interdependence in the twenty-first century. Third, with respect to negotiation and arbitration, the South American nations in particular have “succeeded in developing a theory and practice of exceptionalism regarding their recourse to international law- arbitration of disputes, mediation, bilateral negotiations, and other techniques for the peaceful settlement of disputes- rather than the use of force in their international relations.”⁸ Moreover, multilateralism has become institutionalized as a “foundational architectural principle” for discussing important issues on the post-Cold War inter-American agenda such as democracy promotion, freer trade, counter-narcotics, and international terrorism.⁹ This fact is evidenced primarily by the collective hemispheric commitment to the Summit of the Americas process and, more significantly, in the increasing legitimacy and credibility of the OAS in supporting, promoting, and defending democracy in the region.

⁶ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, [<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/print/nssall.html>], p. 9, Accessed on September 20, 2002.

⁷ Arie M. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 101.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁹ John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., pp. 3-47, *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 25. Please note that this list of issues on the Inter-American agenda is certainly intended to be an exhaustive one.

The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine the dynamics of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. More specifically, this thesis seeks to evaluate whether or not the rhetoric of a “community of democracies” is genuinely representative of, or if it even approximates, the reality of inter-American relations in the post-Cold War world. Resolution of this puzzle is important because,

For decades, even before the OAS was formally established in 1948, the countries of the Western Hemisphere repeatedly expressed their allegiance to democracy and the democratic ideal. At the same time, democratic governments in Latin America were often toppled by coups d'état, and many of the countries of the region lived for years under a variety of oppressive, authoritarian regimes, some of which held periodic but plainly unfair elections.¹⁰

Without a doubt, much progress has been achieved in the inter-American system in the post-Cold War world. This thesis seeks to critically examine the actual impact of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime on the achievement of this historic progress and, potentially, on the *future* of the inter-American system itself. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to resolve the puzzle of whether or not the Americas can transcend the frustrations of its historical legacy regarding democracy. More specifically, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: ***What are the actual and potential consequences of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world for the Western Hemisphere?***

C. SIGNIFICANCE

This thesis has three major arguments. First, the inter-American democracy regime “matters” because it positively impacts state and individual behavior in the post-Cold War inter-American system. Second, the three principles that constitute this regime are mutually reinforcing in perpetuating the “community of democracies” in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, this inter-American “community of democracies” is plausibly on a path to the emergence of a pluralistic security community based on the logic of the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations.¹¹

¹⁰ Domingo E. Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy,” in Tom Farer, ed., pp. 132-149, *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 132.

¹¹ In this context, the term “international organizations” is used very broadly in this thesis to describe not only “formal” organizations such as the OAS, but also international law, institutions, multilateralism, etc.

The significance of this thesis issues from its promise to place the actual and potential consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime into a broader systemic context. Traditionally, scholars of international relations specifically interested in the study of security communities and the democratic peace proposition have focused their research on the North Atlantic community of democracies. The reasons for this are obvious, considering that before the end of the Cold War Western Europe and North America represented the only two geographic regions where peace *and* democracy were well established.¹² Since the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of democracies in the Western Hemisphere, scholars of international relations have studied specific dyadic relationships in the inter-American system such as that of the United States and Mexico.¹³ Significant research has also been conducted on the “Southern Cone” countries.¹⁴ However, the historic progress of the “inter-American system” has too often been neglected, under-appreciated, and undervalued as a case study in this context. There are many potential lessons to be learned from the dynamics of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime for not only the developing world but, more significantly, for the entire international system as well. This thesis seeks to address this crucial gap in the theoretical literature.

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis will use both primary and secondary source material. Primary sources will be limited primarily to official OAS documents to demonstrate the formal evolution of that organization’s role in supporting, promoting, and defending democracy in the post-Cold War inter-American system. Secondary sources will include texts by leading scholars of international relations theory and the Western Hemisphere to provide the reader with the necessary theoretical and regional context of the research question.

¹² Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil*, (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), p. 7.

¹³ See Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard, “The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 295-332, *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

¹⁴ See Andrew Hurrell, “An Emerging Security Community in South America?” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 228-264, *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Arie M. Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World*, pp. 67-124.

The case study method will be employed to answer the research question. Any potential conclusions from this analysis are limited to the specific dynamics of the post-Cold War inter-American system and thus cannot necessarily be generalized to explain the dynamics of similar regimes in other geographic regions. The merits and limitations of extrapolation in this context are many, and both will be specifically addressed in the conclusion of this thesis. In short, the individual and collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations will be assessed in each case study.

E. ORGANIZATION

This thesis will be organized in the following manner. Chapter II will provide a literature review of the major theoretical debates regarding the research question. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with the necessary analytical framework for understanding and appreciating the significance of the research question. More specifically, this chapter will describe and explain the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in the context of the much broader theories of international relations that support it.

Chapter III will identify the operating principles of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. The purpose of this chapter is to specifically outline the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of this regime. This chapter will critically examine the evolution of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime to demonstrate exactly what makes it different from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere.

Chapter IV will be two case studies of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in action. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the actual impact of the inter-American democracy regime on state, and individual, behavior in two of the most high-profile democratic crises in the post-Cold War inter-American system: Paraguay (1996) and Peru (2000). In short, a process-trace of the chain of events leading up to the two democratic crises, and their respective outcomes, will be conducted in order to test the strength of this regime in these two specific cases.¹⁵

¹⁵ The process-trace case study method can provide a strong test of a theory. See Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp 64-67.

Chapter V will specifically answer the research question. First, this chapter will briefly summarize the arguments for *why* the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime matters and thus assess its actual impact on state and individual behavior in the Western Hemisphere. Second, this chapter will consider how some of the challenges described and explained in Chapter II might affect the potential consequences of this regime. In this context, the plausibility of the emergence of a pluralistic security community in the Americas based on the logic of the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations will be assessed. Third, the merits and limitations of extrapolating the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime will be assessed by considering additional variables that seemingly contribute to or impede its actual and potential consequences. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an assessment of potential future areas for scholarly and policy relevant work on this subject.

II. THE LOGIC OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review of the major theoretical debates regarding the research question. The logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime will be critically examined in the following manner. First, a general theory regarding the logic of the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations will be introduced within the context of Immanuel Kant's original work on this subject, *Perpetual Peace*. Second, a neo-Kantian perspective of "perpetual peace," and the potential consequences of it, will be described and explained. Third, the major challenges to this logic will be addressed. Finally, this logic will be specifically applied to the post-Cold War inter-American system.

A. THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The logic that democracy, interdependence, and international organizations are mutually reinforcing in preserving peace is not based on any new or revolutionary thinking in international relations theory. In fact, such logic actually dates back to at least the eighteenth century. More specifically, such logic dates back to at least Immanuel Kant and his famous essay, *Perpetual Peace*.¹⁶

1. The Kantian Perspective on Peace

Kant believed that "it is the destiny of humankind to steadily progress."¹⁷ For Kant, historical progress ultimately meant "perpetual peace." More specifically, it was Kant's conviction that "to work for peace was man's moral duty, to enjoy peace his natural end, and to achieve it his probable destiny."¹⁸ Consequently, in *Perpetual Peace*, "Kant presented a stark choice for governments: they must either make *collective efforts* to ensure survival or face joint self-destruction."¹⁹

¹⁶ See Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Lewis White Beck, ed., pp. 85-135, *Kant on History*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001).

¹⁷ Carl Joachim Friedrich, *Inevitable Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 66. It is important to note that although Kant believed that the fulfillment of this destiny is merely an idea, he still believed, according to Friedrich, that it was a very useful one toward which we should direct our efforts.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. xi.

¹⁹ Sissela Bok, *A Strategy for Peace: Human Values and the Threat of War*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 31. Emphasis Mine.

Kant realized that “perpetual peace” inherently required “perpetual work.” In fact, this is precisely why man had to “work for peace;” it was no easy accomplishment. Moreover, Kant himself argued that war, not peace, was the natural state of man. Consequently, Section II of *Perpetual Peace*, entitled “Containing the Definitive Articles for Perpetual Peace Among States,” begins with the following declaration: “A state of peace, therefore, must be *established*, for in order to be secured against hostility it is not sufficient that hostilities simply be not committed; and, unless this security is pledged to each by his neighbor (a thing that can occur only in a civil state), each may treat his neighbor, from whom he demands this security, as an enemy.”²⁰

Kant produced “three definitive articles” that described how nations could collectively work for perpetual peace.²¹

One is what he called “republican constitutions,” which in the present era we interpret as *representative democracy*, with freedom, legal equality of subjects, and the separation of governmental powers. An understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and republics in turn creates, in Kant’s view, a moral foundation upon which a “pacific union” can be established by treaty in *international law and organization*. Finally, what he called “cosmopolitan law,” embodied in *commerce and free trade*, creates transnational ties of material incentives that encourage accommodation rather than conflict.²²

The Kantian perspective on peace is particularly compelling given its historical context. First, Kant was no stranger to war. He spent most of his life in one of the most militaristic nations in history: Frederick the Great’s Prussia.²³ Second, “there were very few democracies in the world in the late 1700s and no international organizations as we now know them.”²⁴ Finally, and perhaps most compelling, Kant’s perspective on peace significantly deviated from the traditional Westphalian nation-state system into which he was born. For example, since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the end of hostilities in the Thirty Years War, the international system has operated under two

²⁰ Kant, p. 92.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 92-105.

²² Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 29.

²³ Bok, p. 31.

²⁴ Russett and Oneal, p. 29.

fundamental principles: (1) territorial (or external) sovereignty and (2) the reciprocal recognition of the legitimacy of *all* forms of government (i.e. internal sovereignty). Although Kant's three definitive articles were not specifically concerned with the former principle, regarding the latter one, his federation, as originally conceived, was intended to be limited to a "community of democracies." Consequently, Kant's perspective on peace inherently challenged the concept of internal sovereignty in this context.²⁵ More significantly, Kant based this challenge on freely enacted, self-imposed, and universal moral laws to guide political action at the individual, domestic, and international level. In Kant's view, not even national security or self-defense in extreme danger could justify breaching moral principles.²⁶

A "federation of states" or a "community of democracies" based exclusively on "universal moral laws" intuitively seems quixotic to say the least.²⁷ This seems particularly so in an era of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction in which the recalcitrance of just one state, or non-state actor for that matter (as evidenced by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001), can have disastrous consequences. However, it would be a mistake to render Kant's perspective on peace completely *irrelevant*, even if it is in fact admittedly impractical given its focus on morality. If anything, the reality of the awesome destructiveness of these modern weapons inherently makes Kant's goal of perpetual peace more relevant than ever. Consequently, it is necessary to evaluate Kant's three definitive articles in the context of the post-Cold War world.

²⁵ Hedley Bull incorporates this concept of internal sovereignty into his "rules of coexistence." In short, "each state accepts the duty to respect the sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction of every other state over its own citizens and domain, in return for the right to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty from other states. A corollary or near-corollary of this central rule is that states will not intervene forcibly or dictatorially in one another's internal affairs. Another is the rule establishing the 'equality' of all states in the sense of their like enjoyment of like rights of sovereignty." See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 70. For an alternative view of the significance of the Peace of Westphalia and the concept of sovereignty, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., pp. 235-264, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

²⁶ Bok, p. 50.

²⁷ It is important to note that Kant, who wrote *Perpetual Peace* in the eighteenth century, probably never could have fathomed the awesome destructiveness and threat of modern weapons and thus that self-destruction did not require a "joint effort," but could be brought about suddenly by the decision of just one or a few individuals.

2. A Neo-Kantian Perspective on Peace

There are two major problems with Kant's perspective on peace. First, given the fact that the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations did not exist as we currently know them in his lifetime, his logic in *Perpetual Peace* is largely "deductive and speculative."²⁸ Consequently, he cannot provide any empirical evidence to support his logic (because none existed at the time). Second, Kant's passionate conviction that morality supersedes all, even national security, is simply not practical in the post-Cold War world. Nevertheless, Kant's *Perpetual Peace* has become an important symbolic and substantive source of inspiration for scholars of international relations theory, particular those who are advocates of the democratic peace proposition.²⁹ Given the spread of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in the post-Cold War world, Kant's perspective on peace seems more compelling, and relevant, than ever.

A recent, and explicit, "neo-Kantian perspective" on peace is the work of Russett and Oneal (2001).³⁰ In *Triangulating Peace*, the authors specifically address the two major problems identified above regarding Kant's original perspective on peace. First, the authors test Kant's three definitive articles using social scientific methods. More specifically, they use the years 1885-1992 as their empirical laboratory to assess the peacefulness of democratic, interdependent states linked by international organizations. The authors test both the individual and collective impact of these three principles on state behavior. Second, the authors purport that morality and interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive; in fact, they can even be complementary. In other words, the authors argue that peace does not depend on moral conversion but is ultimately derived from calculations of self-interest.³¹

²⁸ Russett and Oneal, p. 272.

²⁹ James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), p. 3. See, for example, Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., pp. 3-57, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).

³⁰ See also Bruce Russett, "A neo-Kantian perspective: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in building security communities," in Emanuel and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 368-394, *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

³¹ Russett and Oneal, p. 269.

a. *The Empirical Evidence for a “Neo-Kantian Peace”*

“The absence of war between democracies comes as close to anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”³² In *Triangulating Peace*, Russett and Oneal specifically seek to test this hypothesis. As Kant did before them in *Perpetual Peace*, the authors begin their neo-Kantian perspective on peace with particular attention to *democracy* as the linchpin of their analysis.³³ In short, they posit a causal relationship between “domestic democracy” and that state’s inclination to resolve conflict with other democracies by means other than or just short of war. Thus, the type of government, in this case democracy, is the independent variable and the absence of war between democratic states is the dependent variable.³⁴ The authors apply the same causal relationship to the principles of interdependence and international organizations. The remainder of this section will summarize the results of their empirical analysis regarding the individual and collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations on state behavior.³⁵ Furthermore, after considering the most relevant challenges to this logic, Russett and Oneal’s neo-Kantian perspective will then be specifically applied to the Western Hemisphere to assess the actual and potential consequences of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world.

Russett and Oneal define democracy as “a country where (1) most citizens can vote, (2) the government comes to power in a free and fair election contested by two or more parties, and (3) the executive is either popularly elected (a presidential system) or is held responsible to an elected legislature (a parliamentary system).”³⁶ The authors concede that it is not always easy to identify a democracy. However, a working definition is necessary in order to determine falsifiability.

³² Jack Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 88.

³³ Russett and Oneal, p. 273. Emphasis Mine.

³⁴ For a more in-depth analysis of this proposition, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 3-42.

³⁵ However, please note that a critical analysis of Russett and Oneal’s research methodology is beyond the scope of this thesis. The purpose of summarizing their results here is simply to recognize the fact that this research has been done by reputable scholars specifically to evaluate the logic of Kant’s three definitive articles.

³⁶ Russett and Oneal, p. 44.

In short, the authors identify two specific features of democracy that restrain them from using coercive threats against, or actually going to war, with other democracies: (1) structural constraints and (2) democratic norms and culture. *Structural explanations* focus on the institutional constraints inherent to democracy. For example, “a separation of powers requires the executive to secure legislative approval and funding for war, and institutions that make democratic leaders accountable for bad decisions make democracies reluctant to go to war.”³⁷ *Cultural explanations* focus on shared democratic norms, perceptions, and expectations. In other words, “democratic peoples, who solve their domestic political disputes without resorting to organized violence against their opponents, should be inclined to resolve problems arising in their relations with other democratic peoples in the same way.”³⁸

Based on their empirical research, Russett and Oneal report that democracy does in fact have an independent impact on state behavior. Even after controlling for the independent and collective pacifying effects of interdependence and joint memberships in international organizations, the authors still found that “two democracies are 33 percent less likely than the average dyad to become involved in a militarized dispute.”³⁹ It is, of course, important to note here that the authors do not claim that democracies are more peaceful in their relations with nondemocratically constituted states. In fact, the authors specifically argue that when a democratic state comes into conflict with a nondemocratic state, it will not expect the latter to be restrained by structural or cultural norms. If anything, the democratic state will most likely be compelled to adapt to the harsher norms of the nondemocratic state, “lest it be exploited or eliminated by the nondemocratic state that takes advantage of the inherent moderation of democracies.”⁴⁰

According to Russett and Oneal, “interdependence increases the prospects for peace because individuals can generally be expected to pursue their interests rationally, and it is not in the interest of one state to fight another with which it has

³⁷ Ibid., p. 53.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 275.

⁴⁰ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 33.

important economic relations.”⁴¹ However, it is important to note that interdependence is not simply limited to economics. “Trade and investment serve as media for communication between nations on a broad range of matters beyond their specific commercial relations, thereby exposing people to the ideas and perspectives of others on a range of issues.”⁴² In short, Russett and Oneal’s empirical research on interdependence suggests that dyadic states will try to avoid conflict when their commercial relations are considered economically important. “Two states with a relatively high level of bilateral trade are 33 percent less likely to become involved in a dispute than are states with an average level of interdependence, all other things being equal.”⁴³ Perhaps even more significantly, the authors reported a positive correlation between the general economic openness of states, even when controlling for the level of their respective bilateral interdependence.

Russett and Oneal also reported an independent impact on state behavior regarding international organizations. More specifically, “a pair of states that shares membership in a substantial number of international organizations is 24 percent less likely than average to have a dispute, holding other influences constant.”⁴⁴ Thus, the independent effects of democracy and interdependence, each at 33 percent, are obviously more substantial than the independent effects of international organizations. However, democracy, interdependence, and international organizations impact state behavior both individually *and* collectively. More specifically, as the post-Cold War world demonstrates, democracies tend to be interdependent and members of the same international organizations. In other words, as one of these principles increase the others do not remain constant or decrease. In this context, it is important to note that the authors

⁴¹ Russett and Oneal, p. 277.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Russett and Oneal, p. 279.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 281.

reported that the likelihood of a dispute drops by **71 percent** if all three principles are increased simultaneously.⁴⁵

b. Potential Consequences of a Neo-Kantian Peace

Russett and Oneal's research indicates that democracy and interdependence have the greater individual impact on state behavior, but also that international organizations generally support these two principles. Moreover, the *collective* impact of these three principles results in a mutually reinforcing system that plausibly increases the prospects for peace.

Assuming Russett and Oneal's research findings are true, a more specific potential consequence of increased democracy, interdependence, and international organizations is the emergence of a "pluralistic security community," in which the use of force is almost virtually unimaginable.⁴⁶ In this context, a "community of democracies" whose members are also highly interdependent and participate in international organizations that affirmatively promote both democracy *and* interdependence should, in theory, be inherently peaceful in their relations with one another; perhaps even more peaceful than a security community not based exclusively on these three principles. The argument for the correlation between this neo-Kantian perspective and the potential emergence of a security community is as follows:

Democracies rarely fight each other: they perceive each other as peaceful. They perceive each other as peaceful because of the democratic norms governing their domestic decision-making processes. For the same reason, they form pluralistic security communities of shared values. Because they perceive each other as peaceful and express a sense of community, they are likely to overcome obstacles against international cooperation and to form international institutions such as alliances. The

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 282. Emphasis mine. Russett and Oneal's findings seemingly validate Kant's deductive and speculative logic regarding democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. This statistic is particularly relevant to the post-Cold War inter-American system because, with the obvious exception of Cuba, the remaining countries are all democracies and members of many of the same international organizations (e.g. OAS, UN, etc.). Moreover, interdependence continues to grow as legislators in respective countries consider expansion of existing agreements (e.g. NAFTA and MERCOSUR) and the creation of new ones (e.g. FTAA).

⁴⁶ See Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney Burrell, Robert Kahn, Maurice Lee, Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim, and Richard Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

norms regulating interactions in such institutions are expected to reflect the shared democratic values and to resemble the domestic decision-making norms.⁴⁷

It is necessary to identify exactly what constitutes a “security community” so that the potential for the emergence of such a community in the Americas, based on the three principles of the inter-American democracy regime, can be assessed in future chapters of this thesis. In short, a security community is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.”⁴⁸ Security communities can be either loosely or tightly coupled. Loosely coupled security communities exhibit the minimal definitional properties just described. Tightly coupled security communities, on the other hand, exhibit much more hierarchy in their relations with one another. This thesis is concerned with the former type of security community, as it is seemingly more applicable to the dynamics of the post-Cold War inter-American system.

A security community consists of three “tiers.” The first tier concerns the precipitating conditions that compel states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and to cooperate. The second tier examines the positive, dynamic, and reciprocal relationship between the structure of the region, defined by material power and knowledge, and social processes, defined by organizations, transactions, and social learning. These dynamics create the conditions for the third tier: mutual trust and collective identity formation.⁴⁹ More specifically, according to Deutsch (1957), a security community is characterized by

a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we feeling,” trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-image and interests; of mutually successful predictions of state behavior...in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention,

⁴⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., pp. 357-399, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 371.

⁴⁸ Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,” in Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., pp. 29-65, *Security Communities*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 30.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 37.

communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making.⁵⁰

A security community can be based on principles other than democracy, interdependence, and international organizations.⁵¹ Certainly shared identities and mutual trust can be forged in other ways. However, some scholars of international relations argue that liberal ideas such as democracy and interdependence are more prone than are other ideas for the promotion of a collective identity, mutual trust, and peaceful changes.⁵² Demonstrating whether liberal ideas are more prone than are other ideas in the development of security communities is definitely beyond the scope of this thesis. However, given the demonstrated individual and collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations on state behavior, this thesis is interested in critically analyzing the dynamics of a security community based on these three principles. More specifically, this thesis is interested in assessing the prospects for the emergence of such a community in the inter-American system in the post-Cold War world.

B. CHALLENGES TO THE LOGIC OF DEMOCRACY, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Numerous challenges exist to the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations just described in the previous section.⁵³ However, the results of Russett and Oneal's research address many of these challenges. Therefore, this section of the thesis will specifically focus on the challenges that this author personally found the most challenging to this logic.

The primary challenge is traditional realist theory.⁵⁴ Interestingly, Mearsheimer (2001), a distinguished international relations scholar of the realist persuasion concedes

⁵⁰ Deutsch et al., p. 6.

⁵¹ Moreover, the principles and norms inherent to the neo-Kantian perspective can in principle be unlearned, since collective identities might change over time.

⁵² Adler and Barnett, p. 40.

⁵³ For a detailed critique of the democratic peace proposition and the "Kantian Peace" see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., pp.157-201, *Debating the Democratic Peace*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).

⁵⁴ An excellent source for a more in-depth analysis of this broader theoretical debate is David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, (New York: Columbia University Press).

that, “as challenges to realism go, democratic peace theory is among the strongest.”⁵⁵ Nevertheless, realists still generally dispute the claims that democracies do not fight other democracies. Their dispute is largely definitional (e.g. what is a “democracy” and what constitutes “war”). Fundamentally, though, the dispute is a function of the realist conviction that the structure of the international system, and its anarchic ordering principle, are the primary determinants of state behavior. Anarchy thus compels states to operate in a competitive, self-help system in which the maximization of power, self-interest, and survival are the exclusive aims. Realists deem the structural/institutional and normative/cultural constraints of democracy irrelevant because major qualitative change is impossible and thus the fundamental causes of international conflict cannot be transcended.⁵⁶ Moreover, since states are by nature fundamentally self-interested, realists have also traditionally emphasized that “it is naïve and potentially even dangerous to think that states could ever form collective identities.”⁵⁷

Many realists concede the fact that modern democracies have not waged war on one another.⁵⁸ Some realists, such as Schweller (2000), actually conclude that “democracy can ameliorate some of the causes of war cited by Hobbes and other realists, but it cannot entirely eliminate them.”⁵⁹ This criticism is unfair though because the

⁵⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 367.

⁵⁶ Randall L. Schweller, “US Democracy Promotion: Realist Reflections,” in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., pp. 40-62, *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 43.

⁵⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 229.

⁵⁸ However, it is important to note that realists do not really have a choice in this matter because it is an empirical fact. See, for example, Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 16. Russett reports that it is impossible to identify any wars between democratic states dating back to 1815 (out of approximately 71 interstate wars involving a total of nearly 270 participants). One recent possible case of two democracies waging war on one another is the militarized interstate dispute between Ecuador and Peru in 1995. However, given the scope limitations of Russett’s theory, it is difficult to classify this case as potentially disconfirming because Peru’s status as a “democracy” is questionable at the time (after the 1992 *autogolpe*). It is questionable because, for Russett, only “liberal democracies” qualify as democracies. Moreover, statistics regarding the battle-deaths in this dispute vary greatly from as little as 300 to as many as 1,000. The actual number is important because Russett uses a threshold of 1,000 battle deaths to classify “war.” Regardless of the whether Peru can be considered a “democracy” or how many actual battle-deaths occurred, the Ecuador-Peru dispute is significant because, in both countries, domestic public opinion supported the use of force against the other. See David R. Mares, *Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America*, (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 160-189.

⁵⁹ Schweller, p. 43.

democratic peace proposition is a probabilistic theory.⁶⁰ Therefore, the important question is not whether democracy can eliminate conflict but whether it can make conflict less likely. Russett and Oneal's research seems to suggest that it *can* make conflict less likely. One more problem regarding democracy in this context though is the problem of backsliding. Mearsheimer argues that no democracy can be certain that another democracy will retain their liberal, democratic integrity. Thus, "prudence dictates that democracies prepare for that eventuality, which means striving to have as much power as possible just in case a friendly neighbor turns into the neighborhood bully."⁶¹ This point is compelling; however, empirically, it has not yet been a problem in the post-Cold War world. More importantly, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the point has already been effectively dealt with in the context of the dynamics of the inter-American system.

The realist critique of interdependence and international organizations follows the same logic. Regarding interdependence and free trade, Schweller in particular argues that they reinforce competition and that competition produces winners and losers.⁶² Although the free-market does produce winners and losers, it has also proven to be a seemingly "indispensable vehicle for producing wealth."⁶³ While import-substitution, socialism, and communism have all failed, "the expanded trade and investment at the core of globalization provides countries with an opportunity to increase their exports and growth and so improve the overall standard of living of their peoples."⁶⁴ Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence to support that economic competition or inequality inevitably

⁶⁰ The neo-Kantian perspective posited by Russett and Oneal regarding the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations is also a "probabilistic theory."

⁶¹ Mearsheimer, p. 368.

⁶² Schweller, p. 53.

⁶³ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-first Century*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), p. 1.

⁶⁴ Carol Lancaster, "Developing Countries: Winners or Losers?" Chapter 30, [<http://216.239.57.100/search?q=cache:yFMqpbfLcZMC:web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/C30Lanca.pdf+%22Developing+Countries:++Winners+or+Losers%3F%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>], p. 657, Accessed on January 2, 2003. Although Lancaster argues that the potential negative impacts of globalization, such a "relative deprivation," are often overstated, she also argues that the leaders of the international economy (particularly the United States) need to develop "social safety nets" for developing countries to deal with globalization's many challenges.

increases the risk of conflict. In fact, according to some economists at the World Bank, there is absolutely no correlation between inequality, whether of income or land, and the risk of conflict.”⁶⁵

Regarding international organizations, realists argue that they are insignificant determinants of state behavior because they are “purely reflective of the power and interests of states: they are just power politics translated into a different idiom.”⁶⁶ Although it is true that international organizations usually do not have the capacity to force compliance on a given issue, some can still perform very important functions that can potentially influence state behavior. For example,

They may encourage cooperation by facilitating consultation and coordination among their members. They may create norms that make noncompliance with their decisions politically difficult. More centralized IGOs can impose various economic sanctions: allow states to impose countervailing tariffs, freeze assets, refuse to grant loans, prohibit commercial aviation or shipping, for instances.⁶⁷

The following counter-arguments are possibly even more challenging to the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. First is the argument that the democratic peace is merely a phenomenon of the Cold War.⁶⁸ Gowa (1999) discredits the entire democratic peace hypothesis by arguing that the peace that has existed among democratic countries after 1945 can simply be interpreted as “a product of the interest patterns that the advent of the Cold War induced.”⁶⁹ Furthermore, she argues that “a democratic peace did not exist in the pre-1914 world, and it cannot be

⁶⁵ See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War,” February 17, 1999, [<http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict>], Accessed on January 20, 2002.

⁶⁶ Andrew Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach,” in Volker Rittberger, ed., pp. 49-72, *Regime Theory and International Relations*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 51.

⁶⁷ Russett and Oneal, pp. 280-281.

⁶⁸ Another important critique of democratic peace theory is that democracy simply has not been around long enough to draw any definitive conclusions. For example, until the latter half of the twentieth century, democratic states were a rarity, making the random chance of war between them close to zero. Thus, the absence of war between democracies in this context proves little. This logic is particularly relevant to the “post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime,” as its formalization is just over a decade old.

⁶⁹ Joanne Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 3.

extrapolated to the post-Cold War world.”⁷⁰ However, as Russett and Oneal note, “the idea that alliances are formed against a common enemy ignores the deeper of question of *why* the enemy is perceived as common.”⁷¹ Mutual trust and identity as “democratic states” surely shaped the perception of those allied against the Soviet Union (during the Cold War). Moreover, as nations continue to reap the peaceful benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations there is no reason to believe why mutual trust and identity as “democratic states” will not continue to grow in the post-Cold War world. In this context, one possible explanation of the democratic peace is,

The meaning of the identity “democratic state” is changing as states begin to internalize the belief that democratic states do not make war on each other. If democratic peace theorists are right this regularity has always existed, but only recently has it become part of the meaning of the democratic type.⁷²

In other words, perhaps democracy (as well as interdependence and international organizations) is, as Wendt (1994) argued regarding anarchy, simply “what states make of it.”⁷³ The three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations definitely seem to constitute the collective identity of international society at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Second is the *process of democratization* itself and the comparative *level of democracy* in a given dyad. Snyder (2000) concedes that well-established mature democracies consistently demonstrate peaceful inclinations toward one another, but that democratizing regimes are more war-prone than stable political regimes.⁷⁴ This argument is actually consistent with the general democratic peace hypothesis, which is limited to “well-established democracies.” Thus, according to Russett and Oneal, “if policies designed to promote democracy around the world lead promptly to the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices, there is no reason, even in the

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 113.

⁷¹ Russett and Oneal, p. 60. Emphasis Mine.

⁷² Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, pp. 226-227.

⁷³ See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., pp. 77-94, *International Organization: A Reader*, (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), p. 80.

⁷⁴ See Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, (W. W. Norton & Company), p. 310.

short term to expect an increase in the frequency of violence between countries.”⁷⁵ The challenge here that Russett and Oneal do not address though is that there is a big difference between the consolidation and deepening of democracy. According to Diamond (1996), consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to break down. Democratic deepening, on the other hand, improves the quality, depth, and authenticity of democracy in several dimensions:

Fairer, freer, more vigorous, and more extensive political competition; broader, more autonomous, and more inclusive participation and representation; more comprehensively and rigorously protected civil liberties; and more systematic and transparent accountability.⁷⁶

In short, democratic consolidation is concerned primarily with democratic survival. Democratic deepening, on the other hand, is concerned primarily with the quality or level of democracy. Consequently, given the role that Russett and Oneal attribute to structural and cultural explanations in maintaining the democratic peace, one would intuitively expect a positive correlation between the deepening of a given state’s democracy and the individual impact of these particular restraints on state behavior. Weart (1998) argues that well-established republics, whether democratic or oligarchic, are inhibited by their fundamental nature from warring on one another. However, he also purports that “republics do get into wars with their own kind when one of them is not well-established, that is, when its leaders cannot fully be trusted to practice toleration instead of coercion.”⁷⁷ In other words, republics can get into wars with their own kind when, in the case of democracies, they are not at the same level of democracy or have not experienced sufficient democratic deepening. This argument is particularly challenging in the context of the inter-American system, as the level of democratic deepening varies throughout the entire hemisphere.

⁷⁵ Russett and Oneal, p. 276.

⁷⁶ See Diamond, pp. 54-55.

⁷⁷ Spencer R. Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 294.

Another challenge within the context of democratic deepening is nationalism. According to Kupchan (2002), a collective public nationalism is at the heart of liberal democracy.

It is the critical ingredient that brings the faceless state to life by merging with the mythical nation, the resulting nation-state then able to embrace the citizen through its emotional allure. But nationalism is also a persistent source of rivalry among the very nation-states that it brings to life.⁷⁸

In Latin America in particular, such nationalism has given rise to new leaders such as “President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, a former labor leader born a peasant, and Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador, a former army colonel who led the coup that overthrew President Jamil Mahuad, a Harvard-educated favorite of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in January 2000.”⁷⁹

The final challenge, and possibly the most critical one that must be addressed in this section of the thesis, is the argument that peace has long existed in the Western Hemisphere without the current dynamics of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. In short, empirical evidence demonstrates a relatively low propensity for war in the Western Hemisphere. According to Singer and Small (1972), the Western Hemisphere had the lowest number of wars per year during their sample (0.11) and the lowest battle deaths per year (3,100) of any region of the world.⁸⁰ Thus, the Western Hemisphere has not historically been a very war prone region even before the creation of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.

⁷⁸ Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), p. 117.

⁷⁹ Juan Forero with Larry Rohter, “Native Latins Are Astir and Thirsty for Power,” *New York Times*, March 22, 2003, [<http://nytimes.com/2003/03/22/international/americas/22LATI.html>], p. 2, Accessed on March 23, 2003. According to Forero and Rohter, Gutiérrez was elected president after railing against traditional politicians and promising to cut poverty and scale back market reforms. He was supported by a powerful indigenous movement, Pachakutik, and inspired by another former army colonel and coup plotter, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. In short, in Latin America, there seems to be a very strong link between nationalism and populism. This is particularly troubling because many of the “nationalist” and “populist” policies specifically challenge the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.

⁸⁰ See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War: 1816-1965- A Statistical Handbook*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972), p. 295.

Desch (1998) argues, “the historical experience of the Western Hemisphere suggests that it was *extremely peaceful* even absent democracy and this further confounds the democratic peace argument.”⁸¹ This challenge is significant because, if true, then the actual and potential consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime seemingly become less significant. However, the problem with Desch’s analysis is that it assumes peace is simply defined by the mere absence of war. He does not differentiate between a “negative peace” (the absence of war), a “stable peace” (no expectations of violence), or a “pluralistic security community.”⁸² Moreover, the phrase “extremely peaceful” is somewhat disingenuous. Even though, technically, there has historically been a low propensity for interstate violence in the hemisphere, the legacy of authoritarianism has not exactly been a positive experience for most Latin Americans. Therefore, based on the empirical research of Singer and Small, there has historically been a “quantitative peace” in the Western Hemisphere; but it certainly has not been a “qualitative” one.⁸³

C. THE LOGIC OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME

The logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is based primarily on the collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations on state and individual behavior in the Western Hemisphere. Democracy is the linchpin of this regime, but interdependence and international organizations have important individual and collective contributions to a qualitative peace in the hemisphere. In short, this qualitative peace is based on the collective effort of the inter-American community of democracies to affirmatively strengthen this regime in the post-Cold War world.

⁸¹ Michael C. Desch, “Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War: The United States and the Future of Inter-American Security Relations,” in Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., pp. 245-265, *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), p. 256. Emphasis Mine.

⁸² See Kacowicz, pp. 9-10.

⁸³ The intent of this term is to postulate a level of peace somewhere between a “stable peace” and a “pluralistic security community.” In short, the term “stable peace” does not adequately describe the current dynamics of the post-Cold War inter-American system. Stable peace implies mutual satisfaction with the status quo. Although this generally refers to the “territorial” status quo, this concept can also be logically applied to principles and norms.

The collective effort to strengthen the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world will be described and explained in Chapters III and IV. More specifically, Chapter III will specifically outline the operating principles of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. The following chapter will also critically analyze the evolution of this regime to demonstrate exactly what makes the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime different from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere. The potential consequences of the inter-American democracy regime for the Western Hemisphere in the post-Cold War world will be assessed within the context of the relevant challenges introduced in this chapter that might impede this regime's further strengthening. Moreover, the plausibility of the emergence of a pluralistic security community based on the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime will be specifically assessed within the context of these potential challenges.

III. THE OPERATING PRINCIPLES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME

“Never before in Latin America’s history have so many countries featured constitutional governments, elected in free and competitive elections under effective universal suffrage, that choose to pursue market economy policies.”⁸⁴ In confluence with the increasing legitimacy and credibility of international organizations in the hemisphere, the prospects for inter-American cooperation and peace have never seemed brighter. The last chapter demonstrated the theoretical logic for this argument. This chapter will apply this logic to the post-Cold War inter-American system. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. More specifically, this chapter will describe and explain the origins and evolution of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. Additionally, this chapter will critically analyze the preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere to differentiate them from the new post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.

A. DEFINING “REGIME CHANGE” AND “REGIME STRENGTH”

The post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is certainly not the first regime of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. As noted in the introduction of this thesis, “for decades, even before the OAS was formally established in 1948, the countries of the Western Hemisphere repeatedly expressed their allegiance to democracy and the democratic ideal.”⁸⁵ However, in retrospect, it was not really until the early 1980s that the *reality* of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations began to approximate the rhetoric of it.⁸⁶ Therefore, two questions seem to suggest themselves: (1) What makes the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime different from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere and (2) Does the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime actually impact state behavior? Another way of

⁸⁴ Jorge I. Domínguez and Susan Kaufman Purcell, “Political Evolution in the Hemisphere,” in Albert Fishlow and James Jones, eds., pp. 137-173, *The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 144.

⁸⁵ Acevedo and Grossman, p. 132.

⁸⁶ See Dominique Fournier, “The Alfonsín Administration and the Promotion of Democratic Values in the Southern Cone and the Andes,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 31 (February 1999): pp. 39-74.

framing the latter question is: Does the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime matter? The former question is one of “regime change” and the latter is one of “regime strength.” This chapter will focus on the former question and Chapter IV will focus on the latter one.

In short, a regime is a set of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area of international relations.”⁸⁷ In the specific case of the inter-American democracy regime, principles and norms are represented by democracy and interdependence (e.g. free market, free trade, etc.) and rules and decision-making procedures are represented by international organizations (e.g. international law and multilateral institutions such as the OAS, WTO, MERCOSUR, etc.). The purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements and the principles and norms of a given regime provide its fundamental defining characteristics. Changes in rules and decision-making procedures represent changes *within* regimes, but changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime itself.⁸⁸ A given regime has weakened if its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.⁸⁹ In other words, the *strength* of a given regime is roughly correlative to its actual impact on state behavior. In this context, strength is measured by whether the actions of states in a given regime are consistent with its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.

B. A HISTORY OF REGIMES OF COOPERATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Convergence about the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in the Western Hemisphere is not a new phenomenon. A previous vision for increased hemispheric cooperation in this context is the concept of “the Western Hemisphere Idea,” which actually originated in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The “Western Hemisphere Idea” is the proposition that the peoples of the

⁸⁷ Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes and Intervening Variables,” in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., pp. 97-109, *International Organizations: A Reader*, (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 97.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 98.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 99.

Americas stand in a “special relationship to one another” that sets them apart from the rest of the world.⁹⁰ More specifically, it is the idea that the nations of the Western Hemisphere, having achieved independence far before the majority of modern nations, share a destiny based on common political values. It is the idea that these nations share common economic interests, as well as common security concerns. “It also includes the belief that inter-American cooperation and integration makes domestic political institutions healthier and domestic economies more prosperous.”⁹¹

1. The Rise and Fall of the “Western Hemisphere Idea”

A common criticism of the United States in its inter-American relations has been the alleged inconsistency of its foreign policy. However, this is not necessarily the case. The United States has consistently based its foreign policy objectives on its *perceived* national interests, whether in the Western Hemisphere or abroad.⁹² Ironically, this fact is the source of both the rise and fall of the “Western Hemisphere Idea,” as it has resulted in a dichotomous foreign policy strategy of intervention and neglect by the United States in the region. This is important to appreciate because, as explained in Chapter II, peace, within the context of the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, is ultimately derived from “calculations of self-interest.” Therefore, the argument for why the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime differs from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere is based, fundamentally, on a change in the perceived national interests of the United States in the post-Cold War world. For example, since the end of the Cold War, traditional national interests and threat perceptions have been modified given the increasing importance of the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. This fundamental change in national interests and threat perceptions is evident in Latin America as well. This latter

⁹⁰ Javier Corrales and Richard E. Feinberg, “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions,” *International Security* 43(1) (1999): p. 3. For an in-depth analysis of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” concept, see Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954).

⁹¹ Corrales and Feinberg, p. 4.

⁹² For an analysis of the consequences of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in this context, see Martha L. Cottam, *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).

point is significant because it directly challenges the realist proposition that the norms and principles of a given regime are merely “a record of the methods and results of power politics.”⁹³

a. *Preceding Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere*

Corrales and Feinberg (1999) identify three major regimes of cooperation in the history of inter-American relations.⁹⁴ The first regime lasted from 1889-1906, the second from 1933-1954, and the third began in the late 1980s and constitutes what this author has classified, “the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.” The purpose of this section of the thesis is to critically analyze the respective perceived national interests of the United States and Latin America that established the principles and norms of these three different regimes of cooperation.

Respective perceived national interests of the United States and Latin America precluded the creation of a regime of cooperation before the late 1880s. For example, the early 1800s provided what seemed to be an excellent pretext for increased cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. Trade was rapidly developing between the United States and Latin America. “U.S. exports to Latin America rose from \$6.7 million in 1816 to nearly \$8 million in 1821, despite a slump caused by the 1819 economic panic.”⁹⁵ However, the perceived threat of possible European intervention weighed much more heavily on the minds of U.S. decision-makers. Consequently, in 1823, the President announced the “Monroe Doctrine.” The Monroe Doctrine contained three substantive principles that reflected the perceived national interests of the United States: (1) “The American continents...are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers;” (2) “In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so;” and (3) “We should consider any attempt on [the Europeans’] part to

⁹³ Michael Donelan, *Elements of International Political Theory*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 36.

⁹⁴ See Corrales and Feinberg, pp. 5-9.

⁹⁵ Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to Present*, 2nd ed., (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), p. 83.

extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”⁹⁶

Latin America shared similar national interests at this time. Consequently, Latin American leaders generally approved of the Monroe Doctrine. “Brazil and Colombia even suggested instituting the Monroe Doctrine as a hemispheric doctrine.”⁹⁷ Moreover, in 1826, the presidents of Colombia, Central America, and Mexico invited the United States and Brazil to participate in the Congress of Panama. Conditions thus seemed ripe for the creation of the first regime of cooperation in the hemisphere. However, from the very beginning of their history as independent nations, the reality of inter-American relations did not approximate the rhetoric of it. Although the rhetoric of collective agreement on the principles of the Monroe Doctrine made it seem as if the “Western Hemisphere Idea” had become institutionalized, the reality of inter-American relations at this time was quite different. For example, the United States remained neutral during the Latin American revolutionary wars and was slow in recognizing them once they successfully achieved independence. Latin Americans, on the other hand, “could never make up their mind whether they wanted inter-American cooperation, and if so, whether it should be based on the principle of culture (Latin-Catholic countries only), language (Spanish-speaking countries only), or strategic interest (include a European guarantor, exclude nations with territorial disputes).”⁹⁸ Consequently, a regime of cooperation did not materialize until the late 1880s.

The first regime of cooperation was not created until the U.S. Congress approved a Pan-American conference in 1889. The impetus for the United States was to broaden the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. “Rather than simply seeking to keep extrahemispheric actors out, the U.S. now wanted to create formal institutions to facilitate common political, economic, and security objectives- the establishment of a hemispheric peace-keeping system, including arbitration for the settlement of disputes, and the development of trade-enhancing rules, including a customs union.”⁹⁹ However, although

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

⁹⁷ Corrales and Feinberg, p. 4.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Latin American nations generally welcomed the invitation, their interests at this time were not aligned with the United States on this issue; particularly regarding the creation of a regional customs union.¹⁰⁰ Because the United States and Latin America did not perceive the same national interests, the actual policy results of the 1889 Pan-American Conference were inconsequential. The creation of the conference itself was significant though because it established a precedent for mutual consultation regarding important hemispheric matters. More specifically, the conference was significant because it “constituted a regional precursor to a League-of-Nations-like system of inter-American relations, including a formal organization (with a permanent seat in Washington).”¹⁰¹

In the early 1900s, the perceived national interests of the United States and Latin America began to diverge significantly. For example, in 1904, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine claimed a universal responsibility for the United States in the Western Hemisphere:

In the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.¹⁰²

At this time, Latin America’s perceived national interests were based on the principles and norms of nonintervention (the Calvo Doctrine) and the equal treatment of foreigners (the Drago Doctrine). The logic of these national interests was based on the realities of growing U.S. hegemony in the region. The Latin American nations intuitively knew that they could not balance their power against the United States in the traditional sense because they did not possess substantial power in this regard. Consequently, and impressively, Latin America chose to rely on “Pan-American institutions to deal with the U.S. (and one another) and codifying the norm of nonintervention and consultation.”¹⁰³ Thus, based on their perceived national interests, the nations of Latin America

¹⁰⁰ Albert Fishlow, “The Western Hemisphere Relation: Quo Vadis,” in Albert Fishlow and James Jones, eds., pp. 15-35, *The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 17.

¹⁰¹ Corrales and Feinberg, p. 6.

¹⁰² Quoted in Fishlow, “The Western Hemisphere Relation,” p. 17.

¹⁰³ Corrales and Feinberg, p. 7.

institutionalized multilateralism well before the creation of the OAS. The “Western Hemisphere Idea” was still alive, but just within the southern portion of the hemisphere.

The second major initiative for a regime of cooperation in the hemisphere is evident in the years between 1933 and 1954. In President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s inaugural address, he announced that “in our relations with the western hemisphere, we shall be guided by the principle of the good neighbor.”¹⁰⁴ The rhetoric from both the United States and Latin America again seemed very promising. The concepts of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” were manifest in two very specific ways. First, in the Declaration of Lima, in which the United States and Latin America discussed the potential for “continental solidarity based on democratic values against military assault.”¹⁰⁵ Second, during and following World War II, “they formulated a common policy against European perils, built a system of collective security (the Rio Treaty, 1947), and created a formal organization to address hemispheric affairs (the Organization of American States, OAS, 1948).”¹⁰⁶

Given the rhetoric of democracy and international organizations at this time, conditions seemed much improved regarding the potential persistence of this second regime of cooperation in the region. However, yet once again, the reality of inter-American relations did not match the rhetoric. In short, although the regime contained the principles and norms of democracy and international organizations, it was still missing the third critical variable of interdependence. More important though, the divergence in the perceived national interests of the United States and Latin America at the beginning of and throughout the Cold War resulted in profound hemispheric mistrust. Examples of this antagonism included Latin American countries voting against the United States in the United Nations as well as the United States becoming much less inclined to use, or even consider the use, of hemispheric institutions such as the OAS in the planning and execution of its foreign policy strategy in the region. The Cold War thus marked the fall

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Robert D. Schulzinger, *U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 153.

¹⁰⁵ Corrales and Feinberg, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

of the second major regime of cooperation in the region and, for much of the rest of the twentieth century, of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” itself.

b. The Cold War in the Americas

Throughout the Cold War, perceived national interests compelled the United States to generally abandon the “Western Hemisphere Idea.” A specific example of how perceived national interests shaped U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in this context was George Kennan’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Kennan was the intellectual father of the U.S. containment strategy. Kennan’s corollary is significant because, as Henry Kissinger noted in his own memoirs, “George Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history.”¹⁰⁷ The following corollary to the Monroe Doctrine thus defined the operating principles of inter-American relations, from the U.S. perspective, throughout the Cold War.

...Where the concepts and traditions of popular governments are too weak to absorb successfully the intensity of the communist attack, then we must concede that harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test of American concepts of democratic procedures; and that such regimes and such methods may be preferable alternatives, and indeed the only alternatives, to further communist success.¹⁰⁸

Thus, the operating principles of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War were completely inconsistent with the “Western Hemisphere Idea.” In fact, throughout the Cold War, the United States ended up only supporting or promoting democracy if it did not interfere with its primary foreign policy goal of containment. Democracy was thus no longer necessarily the preferred system of government from the U.S. perspective. Taken to its logical extreme, the Kennan Corollary resulted in a Cold War legacy of undermining legitimate, democratically elected governments if they appeared to have any socialist tendencies (most notably Allende’s Chile and Arbenz’s Guatemala). This extrapolation of Kennan’s logic, and its consequences on inter-American relations throughout the Cold War, is perhaps best exemplified in the following quote attributed to Dr. Henry Kissinger in reference to Allende’s Chile: “I don’t see why we should have to

¹⁰⁷ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 135.

¹⁰⁸ Gaddis Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine: 1945-1993*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), pp. 70-71.

stand by and let a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”¹⁰⁹ Additionally, regarding Guatemala, President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, actually listed his administration’s role in the overthrow of Arbenz as “one of his proudest accomplishments.”¹¹⁰

Perceived national interests in Latin America during the Cold War equally contributed to the fall of the second regime of cooperation, and of the “Western Hemisphere Idea.” First, regarding democracy, Latin American nations such as Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Peru slid back into military control. “What had been a continent pursuing democratic change and incorporating the poor and uneducated rapidly became a set of governments committed to slowing down that process by assuring the maintenance of law and order.”¹¹¹

Second, regarding economics, the logic of interdependence in the inter-American system turned into the logic of dependence. Dependency became the dominant paradigm amongst scholars in post-World War II Latin America. The primary public policy consequence of *dependencia*, throughout Latin America, was import-substitution-industrialization (ISI). Raúl Prebisch, of the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), forcefully articulated the underlying rationale for ISI. In 1963, he argued, “domestic industrialization would foster the spread of technology, increase employment, enhance the productivity of the labor force, thus reducing the region’s vulnerability to international economic forces.”¹¹² Since Latin America’s dependent position in the international system inherently placed external constraints on its development, ISI policies sought to “enhance industrial development through protection of domestic markets via tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions and with targeted subsidies to local producers.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 164.

¹¹⁰ Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

¹¹¹ Fishlow, “The Western Hemisphere Relation,” p. 23.

¹¹² Carlos Lozada, “Economic Policy Trends in Post-World War II Latin America,” *Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review*, (4th Quarter, 1999): p. 39

¹¹³ Ibid.

Initially, ISI seemed successful. Latin American GDP grew at an average annual rate of 5.1 percent from 1951 to 1960 and experienced even higher growth rates in the 1960s expanding at an average annual rate of 5.75 percent from 1961 to 1973.¹¹⁴ In the long term though, ISI policies failed to resolve Latin America's strategic dilemma of its relative dependent position in the international system. In the process of attempting to transcend the external constraints of the international system, Latin America created its own internal constraints. In short, by giving inefficient industries protective tariffs, government subsidies, and tax breaks, Latin America insulated itself from genuine international competition. More specifically, while it was relatively easy to create a basic iron and steel industry, it proved harder to establish high-tech industries like computers, aerospace, machine tools, and pharmaceuticals. Consequently, Latin America generally depended on imported manufactured goods, whereas exports still consisted of non-value added raw materials such as oil, coffee, and soybeans.¹¹⁵ Ironically, from the Latin American perspective, the legacy of ISI was that "this need for foreign inputs aggravated the very problem the region was trying to avoid: external dependence."¹¹⁶

Third, regarding international organizations, the OAS became relatively insignificant to Latin Americans as well because they did not regard their interests as harmonious with those of the United States. Consequently, the OAS was mired in dissent and inaction, and by the early-to-mid 1980s the inter-American system and "The Western Hemisphere Idea" were seemingly moribund.¹¹⁷

c. The Resurrection of the "Western Hemisphere Idea" and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Inter-American Democracy Regime

The Cold War profoundly affected the inter-American system. The inclination of the United States to perceive its national interests strictly through an East-West prism often distorted its policy towards Latin America. In Latin America, authoritarian governments were temporarily able to claim political legitimacy, even in countries with strong and proud democratic traditions, on the grounds of anti-communism

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 204.

¹¹⁶ Lozado, p. 39.

¹¹⁷ Corrales and Feinberg, p. 7.

or populism. However, even though the “Western Hemisphere Idea” was abandoned during this time-period, it was not completely forgotten. The decline of the second regime of cooperation “did not retreat to the low levels of cooperation in the 1906-1933 period.”¹¹⁸ Although the principles and norms inherent to the containment strategy dominated U.S. foreign policy and the principles and norms of the Calvo and Drago Doctrines dominated Latin American foreign policy, the principles and norms of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” were resurrected once again in the early-to-mid 1980s. Important principles and norms of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations although weakened, managed to survive during the period. The resurrection of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” is significant because it represents the origins of a new, third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere: the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. More importantly, it is significant because the origins of this new regime can be specifically traced back not to the leaders of the United States (the hegemon in the region) but to the efforts of various leaders throughout Latin America.

The first of these leaders that deserves mention, and credit, for the resurrection of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” and the origins of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina. In his inaugural speech in 1983, Alfonsín expressed his ambitious vision for Argentina.

With a country with new institutions, democracy, and development, Argentina will bring a significant contribution to establish a more secure and fair international system...Bearing this in mind, I would like to make clear that our foreign policy will coherently mirror our domestic politics...We will seek social justice for Argentines and will not cease to look for ways to establish within the international system some aspects of morality and justice between nations. We will strive for peace for our violence-ridden territory and will seek peace for all inhabitants of this planet. We will seek freedom and democracy for the Argentines, with the resoluteness that provides the traumatic experience of living under authoritarianism and repression. We will fight for freedom and democracy throughout the world.¹¹⁹

In this speech, Alfonsín assured his constituents that he had a great vision for Argentina, for the Western Hemisphere, and for the entire international system. This

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in Fournier, p. 39.

vision was largely based on the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations described in Chapter II. For example, regarding democracy, his commitment was genuine. Moreover, he astutely considered the possibility, or perhaps the likelihood, that others in Argentina (such as the military) might not share this commitment. Consequently, he specifically negotiated democracy clauses in cooperation treaties with various Western European countries (notably Spain in 1987 and Italy in 1988) to preclude the possibility of democratic backsliding.

Regarding interdependence and international organizations (specifically in the context of multilateralism and diplomacy), Alfonsín was even more ambitious. First, in 1986, Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney (of Brazil) negotiated and signed the Argentine-Brazilian Economic Integration Program (ABEIP).¹²⁰ This program was an integral part of Alfonsín's strategy because he firmly believed that democratic consolidation in Argentina was intimately linked to good performance by democratic institutions in the economic sphere; the 1986 treaty was partly founded on the assumption that better integrated economic relations with Brazil could help revitalize Argentina's declining economy.¹²¹ This agreement was a critical antecedent to MERCOSUR and it significantly improved Argentina and Brazil's bilateral relationship. This fact in itself was significant because, as Robert Burr noted, "the theme of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry and struggle for influence in Latin America is the oldest of all the Latin American conflicts."¹²² Consequently, their bilateral relations had historically been characterized by deep suspicion and mistrust.

Second, and perhaps even more important to note regarding the improvement of Argentina and Brazil's bilateral relationship, was the creation of a new nuclear security regime of cooperation. In November of 1985, Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney endorsed the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and promised more cooperation in this field. Alfonsín essentially employed the logic of democracy,

¹²⁰ Although President Sarney also participated in this process, the vision originated in the Alfonsín administration. Argentina drove the process, and Brazil accepted its initiatives. See Michael Barletta, "Nuclear Security and Diversionary Peace: Nuclear Confidence-Building in Argentina and Brazil," pp. 19-38, *National Security Studies Quarterly*, (Summer 1999): p. 21.

¹²¹ Fournier, p. 51.

¹²² Quoted in Hurrell, "An Emerging Security Community in South America," p. 230.

interdependence, and international organizations to inch Argentina and its newly democratic neighbors closer to a de facto loosely coupled security community in the Southern Cone by the early 1990s. For example, in September 1991 Argentina, Brazil, and Chile signed the Mendoza Agreements, which banned chemical and biological weapons. In December of that same year, Argentina and Brazil signed the Foz do Iguacu Declaration, which established a binational organization of nuclear cooperation (a Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, ABACC).¹²³ In retrospect, given the history of suspicion and mistrust between Argentina and Brazil and their respective experiences with authoritarianism during the Cold War, the statesmanship exhibited by Alfonsín and Sarney in this context was truly remarkable and inspiring. “Despite facing a regional security environment apparently predisposed toward the emergence of a nuclear arms race, in their efforts to transform relations these pro-democratic statesmen created a bilateral regime that laid the political, security, and institutional foundations for verified nuclear non-proliferation in the 1990s.”¹²⁴

Another excellent example of the resurrection of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” is the exceptional statesmanship provided by Oscar Arias Sánchez in mediating the Central American conflict.¹²⁵ This example, much like the Alfonsín case, demonstrates the significant role of Latin Americans in institutionalizing the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in the hemisphere. Arias was elected President of Costa Rica in 1986. His extraordinary efforts to provide a Central American solution to a Central American problem ultimately earned him a Nobel Prize for bringing peace and democracy to the sub-region. In short, with skillful diplomacy and dogged determination, Arias persuaded chief executives from Central America to continue negotiations among themselves after negotiations within the

¹²³ Kacowicz, p. 85.

¹²⁴ Barletta, p. 28.

¹²⁵ Although not specifically mentioned in this thesis, it is also important to note the impressive multilateral effort of the Contadora Group. Although negotiations eventually stalled, the subsequent Esquipulas Accords incorporated many key provisions from the Contadora Group (most notably the provision regarding “free and fair elections.”

framework of the Contadora Group stalled.¹²⁶ The final settlement reached was called the Esquipulas Accords, named after the town where the first meeting took place. Most notably, the August 1987 agreement called for free elections and the general democratization of Central America.

2. The Evolution of the Post-Cold War Inter-American Democracy Regime

The creation of the third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere, the post-Cold inter-American democracy regime, has its origins with the great vision and statesmanship of leaders such as Alfonsín and Arias. The changed perceptions of their national interests empowered them to transcend the breakdown of the two preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere. Moreover, changed perceptions of their national interests also allowed them to transcend the Westphalian principle of the reciprocal recognition of the legitimacy of all forms of government discussed in Chapter II. The democracy clause provisions in Alfonsín's foreign policy with Spain and Italy is evidence of this fact. However, perceptions of national interests still were not aligned with the United States. The perceptions of leaders in the United States were still based on the logic of containment and the Kennan Corollary. In fact, one of the primary reasons the Contadora Group failed was because of the United States: the Contadora accord entailed acceptance of the Sandinista regime and it implied a curtailment of U.S. hegemony throughout the region.¹²⁷ However, the end of the Cold War fundamentally changed U.S. perceptions of its national interests and eventually aligned them with Latin American perceptions.¹²⁸ The end of the Cold War thus finally provided the necessary and sufficient pretext for the complete resurrection of the "Western Hemisphere Idea" and the creation of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.

¹²⁶ Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 215.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

¹²⁸ It remains to be seen exactly how the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 will continue to affect inter-American relations, particularly from the perspective of the United States. Although Latin America is certainly not the highest priority on the Bush Administration's foreign policy agenda, there is not yet any reason to believe that the United States will completely revert back to a neo-Kennan Corollary regarding international terrorism. In fact, according to Russett and Oneal's findings, since democracies are more likely to cooperate, perpetuating the inter-American community of democracies should still remain high on the inter-American agenda. One real concern, however, is how the politics of September 11 will potentially affect the enlargement of NAFTA and the proposed FTAA.

a. *The Transformation of Power*

According to Heraldo Muñoz, the end of the Cold War has inevitably improved the prospects for collectively supporting, promoting, and defending democracy in the Americas because now “it can be defended without risk of entanglement in the East-West confrontation.”¹²⁹ This is because the absence of both an overriding ideological or geostrategic threat in the post-Cold War world has resulted in the transformation of the international system from a bipolar world to a multipolar, globally interdependent one. This structural shift in the international system has resulted in the conceptual transformation and thus redefinition of power in the post-Cold War world. In short, states must now consider new dimensions of security because “national security has become much more complicated as threats have shifted from military ones (that is, threats against territorial integrity) to economic and ecological ones.”¹³⁰ Consequently, traditional hard power (military) resources are less applicable to address many of the security issues in the post-Cold War world.¹³¹ Soft power (ideological and institutional) resources are now more often the most applicable to address many of these new post-Cold War challenges. Interestingly, Latin American leaders like Alfonsín, Sarney, and Arias had the vision to attempt to institutionalize these norms in the Southern Cone and Central America well before the end of the Cold War; and well before the leaders of the United States aimed to do so too.

b. *The Operating Principles of the Post-Cold War Inter-American Democracy Regime*

Genuine convergence on the three principles of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime has literally taken over two centuries. Interestingly, this regime very much resembles the vision provided by Alfonsín in Argentina well before the end of the Cold War: democracy and interdependence are the primary principles and norms of the regime, and international organizations and other forms of multilateralism (OAS, Summit of the Americas process, etc.) are constructively used as mechanisms to

¹²⁹ Heraldo Muñoz, “The OAS and Democratic Governance,” *Journal of Democracy*, 4, No. 3 (July 1993): p. 29.

¹³⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 179.

¹³¹ This is particularly true in Latin America, where the greatest security threats tend to be internal (e.g. civil-military relations, democratization, economic development, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, education, etc.).

reinforce these principles and norms. The principles and norms of this new regime differ significantly from the norms and principles of preceding regimes of cooperation. This difference has resulted in changed mutual perceptions of national interests in Latin America. These common interests are identifiable in the formal milestones of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.

c. Formal Milestones of the Post-Cold War Inter-American Democracy Regime

In the post-Cold War world, the consensus in the Western Hemisphere regarding the virtue of democracy is truly remarkable. According to Fernando Cardoso, the former president of Brazil, “democracy has a worldwide reach that probably has not been equaled at any other moment in the history of mankind. This extraordinary reach reflects the universality of the values on which the democratic system is based.”¹³² Consequently, a new inter-American democracy regime has emerged in the post-Cold War world based on the mutual belief in the collective defense of democracy and human rights. This new democracy regime inherently rejects the Westphalian principle of the reciprocal recognition of all forms of government and claims only one acceptable form of government in the Western Hemisphere: democracy. Instead of simply accepting the legitimacy of the existing international system, the Western Hemisphere seeks to affirmatively alter the existing order (at least on a regional level).

The formalization of this third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere can be dated to June 1991.¹³³ At this time, the General Assembly of the OAS adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American system. The General Assembly also adopted Resolution 1080 on representative democracy,

¹³² Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “Democracy as a Starting Point,” *Journal of Democracy*, 12, No. 1 (January 2001): p. 8.

¹³³ It is important to note that this date is admittedly arbitrary. There are far too many hemispheric agreements on democracy that predate the Santiago Commitment to mention all of them in this thesis. Consequently, this thesis is primarily concerned with the formal milestones achieved after the Cold War. However, one significant protocol that does deserve mention is *The Protocol of Cartagena de Indias*, approved at the 14th Special Session of the OAS on December 2, 1985. This agreement raised the organization’s obligations to advance democracy to an explicit purpose. This document amended the OAS Charter to add a new provision under Article 2 of Chapter 1, “Nature and Purposes.” The character henceforth enshrined the regional obligation to “promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention.” Subsequent OAS declarations and action plans of the Summit of the Americas process have reaffirmed and elaborated this duty. See Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler, “The OAS Democratic Solidarity Paradigm: Questions of Collective and National Leadership,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 43, No. 1 (Spring 2001): pp. 103-126.

which set up mechanisms for an automatic response to any illegal interruption of the democratic process in any country in the Western Hemisphere.¹³⁴ More specifically, Resolution 1080 stated, “governments shall be held internationally accountable to the regional community for the means by which they have taken and secured power.”¹³⁵

In December 1992, the Washington Protocol was approved, which allows for “the suspension of a member state where a democratically elected government is overthrown through the use of force.”¹³⁶ The Washington Protocol represents the first attempt to strengthen the new post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. In the context of regime strengthening, it is important to note that Argentina proposed this historic reform.¹³⁷ This is significant because, once again, it demonstrates the multiple and collective contributions to the origins, creation, strengthening, and persistence of this third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere.

Further strengthening of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime has continued within the context of the “modern” Summit of the Americas process. In January 1994, President William J. Clinton proposed to organize a Presidential Summit in Miami, Florida to discuss the post-Cold War inter-American system agenda. This proposal was significant because, although it was not the first Presidential Summit of the Americas (the first was in July 1956 and the second was in April 1967), it was the first Presidential Summit of the Americas in the post-Cold War world. The agenda discussed at the first modern Summit of the Americas meeting in 1994 included:

- Democratic principles and values; strengthening of institutions.
- Common strategies in the consolidation of democracy, expansion of commerce, and increased integration.
- Mechanisms that ensure the benefits of democracy and economic reform.
- New relationships to overcome obstacles to development.
- Integration and reinforcement of existing hemispheric institutions.

¹³⁴ Resolution 1080 has been a key factor in helping manage crises in the hemisphere. It has been invoked on four occasions: Peru (1992), Haiti (1993), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996).

¹³⁵ Acevedo and Grossman, p. 132.

¹³⁶ Muñoz, p. 37.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

- Counter-narcotics trafficking.
- Growth and prosperity- growth of trade, mutual benefits, better labor conditions, and protection of the environment.
- Social matters: poverty, health, education, and the creation of jobs.¹³⁸

The 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami was the first Summit in which all the leaders were democratically elected, as well as the first one to include Canada and the Caribbean island nations. The Summit produced a “Declaration of Principles” and a “Plan of Action” signed by all 34 Heads of State in attendance. The “Declaration of Principles” established a pact for development and prosperity based on the preservation and strengthening of the community of democracies in the Western Hemisphere. The “Plan of Action” outlined numerous initiatives for which individual countries would be responsible for at future Summits. One of the most significant initiatives that emerged from the Miami Summit was the proposed FTAA by 2005.

The second modern Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago, Chile, was collectively organized by the nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is important to emphasize the active participation of sub-regional organizations, as well as that of the OAS. The Santiago Summit produced a “Plan of Action,” and its initiatives were divided into the following categories:

- Education, the principal matter of the second summit.
- Preserving and Strengthening Democracy, Justice, and Human Rights.
- Economic integration and free trade.
- Eradication of poverty and discrimination.¹³⁹

The most significant achievement of the Santiago Summit was that it institutionalized the Summit of the Americas as a process to address the pressing issues of the post-Cold War Inter-American agenda.

The third modern, and most recent, Summit of the Americas took place in April 2001 in Quebec City, Canada. The Quebec Summit was specifically dedicated to the collective vision of a fully democratic Western Hemisphere. As President George W.

¹³⁸ See “The Summit Process,” Summit of the Americas Information Network, [<http://www.summit-americas.org/eng/summitprocess.htm/>], Accessed March 24, 2002.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

Bush told the assembled leaders at the start of the Quebec Summit, “the most important aspect of this event is our reaffirmation that this Summit is a gathering of, by, and for democracies and democracies only.”¹⁴⁰ The Summit concluded with the signing of a “democracy clause,” and the collective understanding that membership in the proposed FTAA should also require a strong commitment to democracy and human rights.

In the democracy clause, the leaders of the Western Hemisphere declared, “the values and practices of democracy are fundamental to the advancement of all our objectives. The maintenance and strengthening of the rule of law and strict respect for the democratic system are, at the same time, a goal and a shared commitment and are an essential condition of our presence at this and future Summits.”¹⁴¹ Moreover, similar to the spirit of the Santiago Commitment, Resolution 1080, and the Washington Protocol, the democracy clause affirms that “any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the Hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the participation of that state’s government in the Summit of the Americas process.”¹⁴²

The Quebec Summit also tasked the OAS to prepare an Inter-American Democratic Charter to reinforce OAS instruments for the active defense of representative democracy. This Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted by a special session held in Lima, Peru on September 11, 2001.¹⁴³ The Charter represents the consolidation of the new post-Cold War Inter-American democracy regime into a coherent framework that aims to positively impact state behavior. The Charter combines, and more importantly expands upon, all the previous agreements facilitated by this democracy regime for the collective defense of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. For example, Article 20 states:

In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in any member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request the immediate

¹⁴⁰ Martha Pinzon, “The Democracy Clause and the Declaration of Quebec City,” *Americasnet*, [http://www.americasnet.net/Commentators/Martha_Pinzon/pinzon_31_eng.htm/], p. 1, Accessed January 23, 2002.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ This charter has already been invoked once, in Venezuela (2002).

convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate.¹⁴⁴

The principles and norms of “The Western Hemisphere Idea” regarding democracy have been completely resurrected in the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. The rhetoric of a commitment of democracy has always existed in the hemisphere, but the difference in the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is the institutionalization of democracy as the only acceptable form of government. Perhaps more impressive, however, is the increasing levels of interdependence and integration evident in the post-Cold War inter-American system. This is significant because economic interdependence and integration has historically been the one key issue on which the leaders of the United States and Latin America could not converge. In this context, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the proposed FTAA represent phenomenal historic advances. None of these agreements or proposals would have been possible without convergence, and linkage, regarding the principles and norms of democracy and interdependence: a successful model of regional interdependence first experimented with by Argentina and Brazil in the mid-1980s. This model is of increasing relevance given the fact that “Latin America has become the fastest growing export market for U.S. goods and services, with exports growing twice as fast to Latin America as to the rest of the world.”¹⁴⁵ Moreover, if projected trends continue, “U.S. exports to Latin America will be higher in 2010 than to Japan and the European Union *together*.”¹⁴⁶ This fact is significant because, as Larry Diamond notes, “with growing trade will come a growing cultural connectedness.”¹⁴⁷

C. ASSESSING REGIME CHANGE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

This chapter has demonstrated that what makes the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime different from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere is that, since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Latin America have finally

¹⁴⁴ Organization of American States, *Inter-American Democratic Charter*, 28th Special Session, Lima Peru, September 11, 2001: p. 6.

¹⁴⁵ Abraham F. Lowenthal, “United States –Latin American Relations at the Century’s Turn: Managing the Intermestic’ Agenda,” in Albert Fishlow and James Jones, eds., pp. 109-136, *The United States and the Americas: A Twenty-First Century View*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company), p. 115.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. Emphasis Mine.

¹⁴⁷ Diamond, p. 103.

achieved genuine convergence regarding their perceived national interests and on the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. Reasons for this convergence are primarily two-fold: (1) the exceptional statesmanship of leaders like Alfonsín, Sarney, and Arias, which provided not only a model but an inspiration for increased cooperation in the hemisphere and, even more importantly, (2) the end of the Cold War itself and the resulting transformation of power.

The following chapter will critically analyze the strength of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. In order to do so, the following chapter will employ the case study method to test the actual impact of this regime on state behavior in the hemisphere. The cases that will be evaluated to test the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations are two of the highest profile cases of democratic crisis in the post-Cold War inter-American system: Paraguay (1996) and Peru (2000).

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IV. THE POST-COLD WAR INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME IN ACTION: ASSESSING REGIME STRENGTH

Never before have the perceived national interests of the United States and Latin America been in such substantial alignment. Never before have the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations been more ascendant in the hemisphere. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the *actual* consequences of this phenomenon on state behavior in the post-Cold War inter-American system. More specifically, this chapter will critically analyze the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in action in order to assess the relative strength of this third regime of cooperation in the hemisphere. The methodology employed to test the strength of this regime is the case-study method. The findings of these two case studies will be extrapolated in the following chapter in order to assess the *potential* consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in the twenty-first century.

A. THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS

This chapter will test the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. The logic of this regime is based on the empirical research of Russett and Oneal regarding the individual and collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations on state behavior introduced in Chapter II. In short, the logic of this regime is that these three principles are mutually reinforcing in perpetuating a qualitative peace in the post-Cold War inter-American system.

The specific case studies selected to test Russett and Oneal's theory regarding the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime are: Paraguay (1996) and Peru (2000). These two case studies were selected for the following reasons. First, both occurred well after the 1991 Santiago Commitment. Both cases thus occurred after the initial formalization of this new regime, and this fact provides reasonable time for the institutionalization of its principles and norms. For example, at the time of the Paraguay crises in 1996, Resolution 1080 had already been invoked on three previous occasions: Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), and Guatemala (1993).¹⁴⁸ Second, in both cases, democracy

¹⁴⁸ See Robert A. Pastor, *Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York: Westview Press, 2001), p. 302.

was ultimately preserved. This provides a unique opportunity to assess the actual consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in two independent cases. In short, if Russett and Oneal's theory is valid, the following should be observed: the mutually reinforcing dynamics of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations (the independent variable) are *primarily* responsible for preserving democracy (the dependent variable) in both case studies. If so, these findings will represent notable evidence supporting the causal proposition. However, if the correlation between the independent and dependent variable is a spurious one, then at least one of the cases should suggest the possibility of an alternative theory (or at least potential intervening variables) to help explain why democracy was still preserved. If so, these finding will represent evidence suggesting that the causal proposition is less robust than originally posited by Russett and Oneal. The two case studies will be critically analyzed in chronological order.

B. PARAGUAY (1996)

Paraguay has had a long, seemingly "pathological," history of military coups and civil conflict. For example, the twentieth century alone saw 26 governments between 1904 and 1994.¹⁴⁹ In 1993, for the first time ever, the Presidency was garnered by a civilian. President Juan Carlos Wasmosy was elected in a free, direct, and competitive election that was monitored by the OAS and numerous other international observers. However, the consolidation of democracy in a country with enormous economic and social problems and virtually no tradition of democratic governance inevitably encountered many difficulties.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, *The 1996 Institutional Crisis in Paraguay*, 1997, [<http://www.upd.oas.org/information/ForoDemocratico/Paraguay/prgy.htm>], Accessed on January 20, 2003. This report is an edited version of the original transcripts from the "OAS Democratic Forum on Paraguay" about the institutional crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996, from the perspective of the government, civil society, and the international community. This particular statistic is attributed to Senator Carlos Podestá, a Colorado Party representative of the government of Paraguay. The context of this statement was during a panel discussion on the democratic crisis entitled: "The Institutional Crisis of April 22 to 24, 1996, from the Perspective of the Government of President Juan Carlos Wasmosy." See [<http://www.upd.oas.org/information/ForoDemocratico/Paraguay/prgypan.htm>], p. 2, Accessed on January 25, 2003.

¹⁵⁰ Arturo Valenzuela, "Paraguay: The Coup That Didn't Happen," *Journal of Democracy*, 8, No. 1 (January 1997): p. 46.

1. Background of the Case

President Wasmosy's most serious challenge to democratic consolidation was the continued involvement of the military in domestic politics, most notably the involvement of army commander Major General Lino César Oviedo.¹⁵¹ Oviedo demanded that Wasmosy appoint not only his preferences for military posts, but also for offices such as Supreme Court Justices. In short, "General Oviedo's involvement in governmental decisions and party politics constituted a direct challenge to the president's authority and a serious threat to Paraguay's fragile democratic transition."¹⁵² Consequently, Wasmosy concluded that his survival as president was contingent upon the removal of Oviedo as commander of the army.

On April 22, 1996, Wasmosy informed Oviedo that he was relieving him of his duties. Oviedo refused to submit his resignation. In fact, Oviedo, who was a key supporter of the military coup in 1989 by General Andrés Rodríguez, informed the president and the commanders of the other military services that "if the 1989 coup had seen bloodshed, the current confrontation could see rivers of blood."¹⁵³ Oviedo's unwillingness to step down as ordered by his commander in chief "touched off a constitutional crisis from April 22 to 24, 1996, that raised profound concern throughout the country and in the international community."¹⁵⁴

In response to the developing crisis, the United States embassy in Paraguay issued the following communiqué: "General Oviedo's refusal to accept the president's decision constitutes a direct challenge to the constitutional order in Paraguay and runs counter to the democratic norms accept by the countries of this hemisphere." The statement

¹⁵¹ It is important to note that General Oviedo manipulated the primary process in 1992 that resulted in Wasmosy becoming the presidential candidate of the ruling Colorado Party. Furthermore, when Wasmosy was elected, this victory was tainted because Oviedo threatened to stage a coup if the Colorado Party was voted out of office in Paraguay. However, Oviedo did not foresee the fact that Wasmosy would eventually seek to limit the role of the military in Paraguayan politics.

¹⁵² Valenzuela, "Paraguay: The Coup That Didn't Happen," p. 47.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Podestá, p. 1.

continued, “any course of action other than the resignation of the general is totally unacceptable and will be met with the appropriate response by the international community.”¹⁵⁵

The response from the rest of the international community, especially from the ambassadors of Argentina and Brazil in Paraguay, as well as from members of the Permanent Council of the OAS back in Washington, D.C., was equally resolute. The international diplomatic community quickly galvanized support for Wasmosy. For example, he received diplomatic support from international organizations such as the European Union (EU), MERCOSUR, and the Rio Group. Moreover, the Permanent Council of the OAS called an emergency meeting to consider whether to convene a General Assembly pursuant to Resolution 1080. This is significant because, technically, there had in fact been no interruption of the constitutional order at this point of the crisis. President Wasmosy was still the Head of State and no military coup had been attempted, nor was there any intelligence to suggest that one was imminent. As Domingo Laíno, Chairman of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) at the time of the OAS Democratic Forum in 1997 explains, Oviedo’s strategy was truly unique and unprecedented.

The insurgents did not go for a traditional coup, that is, an undisguised overthrow of established authority in defiance of the Constitution. That was the traditional way. The insurgents in April in Paraguay tried to inaugurate a new style, which I call “coup under the table.” That is to say, a show of respect for existing laws and the Constitution while applying pressure on threats to remove the constitutional government through resignation. The leader of the insurgency did not aspire to the presidency, he only wanted it to go the speaker of the Congress—the third in the constitutional order of succession. Thus, to all appearances, the Constitution and the rule of law were respected. The leader of the insurgency may have been seeking in this way to run the government from under the table.¹⁵⁶

At the OAS Permanent Council meeting, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott urged fellow members to issue a strong declaration of support for democracy.

¹⁵⁵ Valenzuela, “Paraguay: The Coup That Didn’t Happen,” p. 48.

¹⁵⁶ Domingo Laíno, “Behavior of the Opposition Political Parties and the Reaction of Civil Society,” *OAS Democratic Forum*, [<http://www.upd.oas.org/information/ForoDemocratico/Paraguay/prpandl.html>], p. 1, Accessed on January 25, 2003.

More specifically, he argued, “we face a situation that calls upon our governments and peoples to speak up forthrightly and to take action in support of the proposition that democracy is the right of all peoples in the Americas and that the day of the dictator is over.”¹⁵⁷ It is important to also note that at this point of time in the crisis, the United States had already suspended all military aid to Paraguay and was prepared to impose economic sanctions if deemed necessary. In the end, the OAS declared its collective support for President Wasmosy and condemned the threat to democracy posed by General Oviedo.

On April 24, 1996, General Oviedo officially resigned as army commander and was replaced by General Rodrigo Diaz. After his resignation, Oviedo faced congressional and judicial inquiries into his insubordination. However, the courts failed to convict Oviedo because he was still very influential in Paraguay and, technically, he had “resigned” from office. In the following months after his resignation, Oviedo worked diligently to obtain the presidential nomination for the Colorado party. Ironically, Oviedo was still quite popular among rural Paraguayans based on his strong leadership traits.¹⁵⁸ On September 7, 1997, Oviedo won a close election for the presidential nomination of the Colorado party. However, due to fears by the government that Oviedo might gain presidential victory, a special military tribunal was convened in March 1998. The military tribunal sentenced Oviedo to 10 years in prison for sedition. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, even though the lower courts had failed to convict Oviedo of the very same charge just one year earlier.

After Oviedo’s conviction, his vice-presidential running mate, Raúl Cubas, became the Colorado party’s presidential candidate. On May 10, 1998, Cubas was elected president. His first official action once he assumed office was to pardon Oviedo. On December 2, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that President Cubas had exceeded his executive authority in pardoning Oviedo and he promptly announced that he would not respect its decision. Thus, in just two short years after Oviedo was the source of Paraguay’s first constitutional crisis after their initial democratic elections, he was also

¹⁵⁷ Valenzuela, “Paraguay: The Coup That Didn’t Happen,” p. 51.

¹⁵⁸ Arturo Valenzuela, “The Collective Defense of Democracy: Lessons from the Paraguayan Crisis of 1996,” *A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*, 1999, [<http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/valenz/valenz.htm>], p. 14, Accessed on March 18, 2002.

the source of their second constitutional crisis. Amid rumors that Oviedo ordered the assassination of Vice President Argaña Cubas was impeached by the lower chamber. The impeachment process led to widespread street demonstrations and civil unrest. However, as in 1996, the international community provided its unconditional and collective support for a peaceful resolution of this process.

2. The Democracy Regime in Action

A critical examination of the Paraguay case study suggests that the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime positively impacted state (and individual) behavior. The causal proposition regarding the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations was proven valid because both the Westphalian principle of the reciprocal recognition of all forms of government and the Latin American principle of non-intervention (Calvo Doctrine) were collectively rejected by the nation-states of the inter-American system. In short, the United States, the MERCOSUR countries, and the OAS all worked together to construct a hemispheric network of democratic solidarity in this crisis.

It is important to note, however, that although all three principles of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime seemingly contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Paraguay crisis, the MERCOSUR countries, and the swift action of its presidents, foreign ministers, and even some of their military, probably played the key deterrent role.¹⁵⁹ In short, MEROSUR warned General Oviedo and his supporters that if they were to succeed, Paraguay would suffer sanctions that could potentially exclude them from MERCOSUR's basic agreements. Considering that Paraguay channels a third of its foreign trade through MERCOSUR, this warning had a powerful impact on not only the actors supporting the coup but on public opinion in the country as well.¹⁶⁰

MERCOSUR's warning clearly demonstrates the logic of interdependence and its individual effect on state behavior. More importantly, this sequence of events was

¹⁵⁹ César Gaviria, "The OAS Response to the Institutional Crisis," *OAS Democratic Forum*, [<http://www.upd.oas.org/information/ForoDemocratico/Paraguay/prpancg.htm>], p. 1, Accessed on January 25, 2003. César Gaviria is the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

¹⁶⁰ Antonio Mercader, "The Reaction of MERCOSUR to the Institutional Crisis," *OAS Democratic Forum*, [<http://www.upd.oas.org/information/ForoDemocratico/Paraguay/prpanam.htm>], p. 1, Accessed on January 25, 2003. Ambassador Mercader is the Permanent Representative of Uruguay to the OAS.

unprecedented in Latin America history. First, a regional (South American) economic and trade organization violated the seemingly sacrosanct principle of nonintervention by “intervening” in the domestic political affairs of one of its member states in order to preserve democracy. Second, “legally, the threat to expel an anti-democratic member of MERCOSUR was questionable at that time because the bloc lacked the so called ‘democracy clause’ at the time the April crisis arose.”¹⁶¹ Consequently, had the United States and the rest of the OAS been ambivalent in their support, the expulsion of Paraguay by the other members of MERCOSUR would have been legally open to challenge. It was not until two months after the Paraguay crisis that the four presidents of the MERCOSUR countries met in San Luis, Argentina to sign a formal democracy clause.¹⁶² The MERCOSUR “democratic commitment” states, “the full effectiveness of democratic institutions of democratic institutions is an essential condition for cooperation,” and, “any disturbance of the democratic order constitutes an unacceptable obstacle to the continuity of the integration process.”¹⁶³ This democratic commitment represents a further strengthening of MERCOSUR and of the entire post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime based on the lessons learned from the Paraguay crisis.

The Paraguay case seems to represent a strong case for the actual impact of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime on state behavior in the region.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2. According to Ambassador Mercader, there were declarations by the four presidents that sought to couple the integration process to democracy. The first of these declarations was drawn up at Las Leñas, Argentina, in June 1992, and stated, “Democratic institutions in full effect are an indispensable assumption for the existence and operation of MERCOSUR.” Subsequently, in January 1994, at Colonia del Sacramento, Uruguay, the presidents reiterated their “conviction that integration, insofar as it makes a notable contribution to economic development and social justice, strengthens and consolidates the democratic process of the four countries.” In August 1994, at Buenos Aires, the heads of government once more “reiterated their conviction that integration contributes to development and social justice and to overcoming economic backwardness, thus consolidating the democratic process of the four nations.” Another important bit of background was the agreement signed in Madrid in December 1995 between MERCOSUR and the European Union, in which the members of both organizations declared in Article 1, concerning the basis for cooperation, that respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights, as enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, inspires the domestic and international policies of the parties and forms as an essential element of the agreement. Both this agreement and the declarations cited above indicated a definite desire to honor the principle of democracy, but their legal value as a basis for sanctions in the Paraguayan case could prove more than questionable. Furthermore, though important, none of these statements had the legal force of a ‘democratic clause’ like the one formally embodied by the European Union in its Charter of Paris.

¹⁶² Monica Hurst, “Mercosur’s Complex Political Agenda, in Riordan Roett, ed., pp. 35-47, *MERCOSUR: Regional Integration and World Markets*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 41.

¹⁶³ Mercader, p. 2.

International organizations clearly supported the principles and norms of democracy and interdependence, and these dynamics proved mutually reinforcing in preserving democracy in Paraguay.

A critical analysis of this case does not suggest a viable alternative explanation for the outcome. However, Valenzuela (1999) does offer an interesting intervening variable. According to Valenzuela, “a close examination of the events in Paraguay suggests that growing economic ties with other countries and fears of being isolated economically played a smaller role than did other factors in averting a coup.”¹⁶⁴ The “other factors” that Valenzuela offers are the strong support extended by the armed forces in backing President Wasmosy, as well as the support extended by large segments of the population in Paraguay. These intervening variables, although interesting, are not compelling given Paraguay’s tumultuous history of dictatorial rule, the manipulation of the primary process in 1992 that resulted in Wasmosy’s election in 1993, and the country’s relatively short experience with democratic institutions.

In this context, it is important to note that in April, at the critical moment of the crisis, the Colorado Party largely remained silent.¹⁶⁵ This silence is extraordinary given the fact that the Colorado Party was in power at the time of the crisis; the very party of President Wasmosy, and yet they literally remained silent while MERCOSUR, the United States, and the OAS collectively responded and acted immediately. Considering Paraguay’s lack of experience with democracy, it seems more likely that any strength of their democratic institutions and civil society is probably also attributable to the impact of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. Valenzuela does not adequately consider these exogenous sources of Paraguay’s domestic support for democracy. More specifically, the internalization of the norms and principles of democracy and interdependence is a fundamental purpose of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime. This regime thus inherently aims to not only impact state behavior *among* states, but, just as importantly, individual behavior *within* states as well. Actors conform to the principles and norms of this regime “in part for ‘rational’ reasons (for

¹⁶⁴ Valenzuela, “The Collective Defense of Democracy,” p. 52.

¹⁶⁵ Darío Elías, “Question and Answer Period,” *OAS Democratic Forum*, [<http://www.upd.oas.org/information/ForoDemocratico/Paraguay/prgyqa3.htm>], p. 1, Accessed on January 25, 2003.

instance, because of the costs involved in ‘bucking the system’ and the resources that become available through conformity) but also because they become socialized to accept these values, rules, and roles.”¹⁶⁶ Actors internalize the roles and rules as scripts to which they conform, not always necessarily out of conscious choice, “but because they understand these behaviors to be appropriate.”¹⁶⁷

In the final analysis, the manner in which the Paraguay democratic crisis was resolved provides notable evidence supporting the causal proposition. In this specific case, the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime positively impacted state behavior. The next section will critically analyze the Peru democratic crisis and assess whether the process of its resolution supports or does not support the causal proposition.

C. PERU (2000)

After Alberto Fujimori’s *autogolpe* in April 1992, Peru became a textbook case of an illiberal democracy: “a regime that combines free elections for political office with systematic disrespect for the political and human rights of its citizens.”¹⁶⁸ Although Fujimori governed in this manner throughout his entire presidency, he was still very popular (at least in the beginning). According to Yergin and Stanislaw (2002), Fujimori was considered the greatest president Peru had ever known because of the way he saved his country from economic chaos and a vicious civil war.¹⁶⁹ However, as Peru became the first South American country of the 1990s to slip back into authoritarianism, the reality of Fujimori’s illiberal democracy was never really challenged by any exogenous or endogenous forces in the hemisphere; that is, not until after the 2000 election, a campaign that culminated in a vote that *The Economist* called “the dirtiest vote in South America for a decade.”¹⁷⁰ This section of the thesis will critically analyze the chain of events leading up to the fraudulent 2000 election to test the actual impact of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime on state behavior in this specific case.

¹⁶⁶ Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 29.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America*, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 214.

¹⁶⁹ Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy*, (New York: Touchstone, 2002), p. 255.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 254.

1. Background of the Case

In order to understand the conditions that resulted in Fujimori's downfall following the fraudulent election of 2000, it is necessary to appreciate the conditions that resulted in his initial election to power in 1990. Thus, the chain of events leading up to the 2000 democratic crisis in Peru actually begins a decade earlier.

Stable governments in Peru, whether democratic or authoritarian, have been extremely rare throughout its history. For example, "since 1919, no Peruvian political regime- neither constitutional nor de facto- has endured more than twelve years."¹⁷¹ This political legacy is important in understanding and appreciating the nature of Alberto Fujimori's initial mandate when originally elected president of Peru in 1990. The Peruvian people were desperate for stability, particularly since by the end of the preceding administration of Alan García, "real per capita GDP was estimated to be less than in 1960, and accumulated inflation over the five years was more than 2 million percent."¹⁷² Moreover, at this time, the Shining Path was seemingly on the path to taking over the state: the Shining Path numbered approximately 10,000 combatants, had support of roughly 15 percent of Peru's citizens, and controlled about 28% of the country's municipalities.¹⁷³ In this atmosphere of despair, Fujimori was able to literally come out of nowhere to win the 1990 election. With no formal party affiliation, Fujimori was able to cultivate an image of himself as an outsider. In short, "he posed as an antipolitician, which gave him broad appeal over established parties and figures."¹⁷⁴ His populist strategy obviously worked, as Fujimori won a resounding victory in the second-round of the 1990 election with 62 percent the vote.¹⁷⁵

Upon assuming office in July 1990, Fujimori declared that the Peruvian state was in crisis. This declaration was elaborated on by his close adviser, Hernando de Soto:

¹⁷¹ Cynthia McClintock, "Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic," in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., pp. 309-365, *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 309.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 329.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Steve Stein, "The Paths to Populism in Peru," in Michael L. Conniff, ed., pp. 97-116, *Populism in Latin America*, (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1999), p. 115.

¹⁷⁵ Peter Flindell Klarén, *Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 405.

“This society is collapsing...There is no respect for the state, the parliament, the laws, the judicial system, not even the traffic lights. Nothing works here.”¹⁷⁶ Fujimori exploited his 62 percent mandate to confront Peru’s daunting problems and he enjoyed tremendous policymaking power. Immediately after his inauguration, Fujimori implemented his “Fujishock” strategy. This strategy consisted of a draconian orthodox stabilization package. In short, the Fujimori government slashed price subsidies and social spending. It raised interest rates and taxes in order to tackle hyperinflation. Moreover, “in a move to restore international financial confidence and the reintegration of Peru into the world economy, Fujimori began making regular monthly payments of \$60 million to international financial institutions on the country’s now \$21 billion foreign debt.”¹⁷⁷ Fujimori’s policies were successful in the context of reducing hyperinflation and restoring Peru to the good graces of international financial institutions. Consequently, Fujimori’s success in this regard was rewarded with increased popularity in Peru public opinion polls.¹⁷⁸ However, Fujimori’s reforms were followed by many traumas that directly challenged the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime.

On April 5, 1992, Fujimori suspended the 1979 Constitution, arrested several opposition leaders, dissolved Congress, and dismantled the judiciary. However, “while the *autogolpe* was condemned by the vast majority of intellectuals and political leaders, it was supported by almost 80 percent of the Peruvian population.”¹⁷⁹ In short, from the time of the *autogolpe* in April 1992 and the promulgation of a new Constitution in November 1993, it is nearly impossible to classify the Fujimori government as a democracy (of any kind).¹⁸⁰

The response of the international community was less than resolute in this case. However, it is important to note three very important things in this regard. First, in

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 406.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 408.

¹⁷⁸ Given the history of Peruvian politics, Fujimori was in effect elected to carry out any policies he deemed to be in the national interest of Peru. For most Peruvians at this time, the ends of political and economic stability justified the means. Evidence of this fact is that although poverty predictably worsened under the “Fujishock” strategy, Fujimori still maintained overwhelming domestic support in Peru.

¹⁷⁹ McClintock, “Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic,” p. 331.

¹⁸⁰ The new constitution permitted the reelection of the president, clearing the way for Fujimori’s candidacy in 1995.

retrospect, there was not really much that the international community could have done because it was extremely sensitive to the fact that over 80 percent of the Peruvian people actually supported the coup. Second, the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime had just been formalized with the Santiago Commitment (1991). Consequently, there was no compelling precedent upon which to evaluate an appropriate response by the international community. In fact, this 1992 case established such a precedent as Peru became the very first country in which Resolution 1080 was invoked. Third, the international community was seemingly “more concerned with the increasing threat of the Shining Path, the progress of drug trafficking, and the prospects for economic liberalization than over the setback to democracy.”¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, in the end, Fujimori was compelled to hold elections for a constituent assembly within five months and hold municipal elections with the next year.

The path toward Fujimori’s consolidation of power under the new constitution was smoothed first by triumphs against the Shining Path and then by economic recovery.¹⁸² For example, Fujimori captured the leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán and subsequently arrested more than 1,000 suspected “Senderistas.” Moreover, Fujimori’s economic plan was successful and foreign direct investment increased dramatically. “Real GDP rose at an average annual rate of 6.4 percent in 1993 and 13.1 percent in 1994- the highest rate in the region.”¹⁸³ For the political and economic stability that Fujimori provided, the Peruvian people rewarded him with a second term on the first ballot with an impressive 64 percent of the vote.

After the 1995 elections, Fujimori’s popularity began to decline steadily. Fujimori fell in the polls from above 50 percent over the period from September 1992 until October 1996 to around 30 percent through September 1998.¹⁸⁴ The reason for Fujimori’s decline was political and economic. In short, his political “means” were no longer justified because the economic “ends” were no longer satisfactory. The economy eventually slowed and, absent the results of the early 1990s, Fujimori was now simply

¹⁸¹ Klarén, p. 414.

¹⁸² See McClintock, “Peru: Precarious regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic,” pp. 334-335.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 336.

perceived as authoritarian; something the Peruvian people were willing to accept while the economy was growing, but not any longer. Moreover, at this time, citizens were becoming increasingly concerned with Fujimori's principal advisor, Vlademiro Montesinos.¹⁸⁵ For example, "a poll in early 1997 reported the widespread belief among Peruvians that it was Montecinos, not Fujimori, who was really holding power."¹⁸⁶

As the 1990s came to a close, Fujimori decided to run for a third, and highly controversial, third presidential term. Fujimori's ability to run for a third term was based on a 1998 Supreme Court ruling that entitled him to run once again, "since it would be his first under the new constitution of 1993."¹⁸⁷ In the disputed first round of the April 2000 elections, Fujimori won less than 50 percent of the vote, which forced a run-off election with the second-place finisher Alexander Toledo (a U.S. educated professor of business). In the May 2000 runoff elections, Toledo unexpectedly withdrew "in protest against what he claimed would be electoral fraud."¹⁸⁸

The OAS subsequently suspended its electoral-observation mission and the suspect election inevitably triggered widespread popular protest in Peru and concern throughout the Western Hemisphere.¹⁸⁹ The OAS mission's final report concluded that, "with respect to international standards, the Peruvian electoral process is far from being considered free and fair."¹⁹⁰ This is important to note because "for the first time in the history of OAS election observation, a Latin American election had clearly and carefully been judged illegitimate."¹⁹¹ Nevertheless, even though the OAS mission concluded that the elections were not free or fair, the OAS General Assembly decided to not question the legitimacy of Peru's 2000 elections. "The General Assembly resolved instead to send a

¹⁸⁵ Montesinos was an obscure lawyer and former army captain who was discharged from the army for allegedly passing information to the United States. Montecinos had defended Fujimori from tax evasion charges and specialized in defending drug traffickers. Montecinos was the de facto head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN). See Klarén, pp. 409-410.

¹⁸⁶ Yergin and Stanislaw, p. 254.

¹⁸⁷ Skidmore and Smith, p. 214.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Andrew F. Cooper and Thomas Legler, "The OAS in Peru: A Model for the Future?" *Journal of Democracy*, 12, No. 4 (October 2001): p. 123.

¹⁹⁰ Cynthia McClintock, "The OAS in Peru: Room for Improvement," *Journal of Democracy*, 12, No. 4 (October 2001): p. 137.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

High-Level mission to Peru, with a mandate *not* to review the 2000 elections but instead to ‘strengthen democracy’ (thereby implying that democracy already existed) and to ‘explore’ future reforms.”¹⁹² Moreover, unlike in the Paraguay case, the United States decided to not suspend aid to Peru. A comment on May 30 by a U.S. State Department spokeswoman that the election was “invalid” was withdrawn the next day in favor of a statement that the election was merely “flawed.”¹⁹³ In fact, it was not until the September 14 release of a video that showed Montecinos bribing an opposition congressman-elect that the international community finally acted to compel Fujimori to hold new elections.

2. The Democracy Regime in Action?

A critical examination of the Peru case study suggests that the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime had less impact on state behavior in this case than it did in the Paraguay case. The evidence in this case study is generally less supportive of the causal proposition regarding the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. However, this case does suggest at least one alternative explanation for state behavior.

In short, the Peru case study highlights one very important obstacle to the continued evolution of foreign relations in the inter-American system: national interests defined in terms *other than* the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. The *primary* U.S. interest in Peru throughout Fujimori’s presidency was not democracy; it was the reduction of illicit narcotics production and trafficking.¹⁹⁴ For example “in May 1991 Fujimori signed a crucial antinarcotics agreement with the United States that was much more to the right than Fujimori’s campaign position on the issue.”¹⁹⁵ The consequence of this cooperation for Peru was very good relations with the United States. Moreover, through 1999, “the ‘international financial community,’ including the U.S. Treasury Department and most U.S.-based businessmen, believed that Peru needed a ‘strong leader’ and that a third Fujimori term was the best hope for the

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 139.

¹⁹⁴ See Maureen Taft-Morales, Peru: Recovery from Crisis, Congressional Research Services, updated June 22, 2001, [<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30918.pdf>], Accessed on May 8, 2002.

¹⁹⁵ McClintock, “Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic,” p. 330.

continuation of Peru's free-market policies.”¹⁹⁶ Although Fujimori's eligibility for a third term seemed intuitively absurd to most experts, it was not questioned by the United States or the international financial community.¹⁹⁷

D. ASSESSING REGIME STRENGTH IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Paraguay case study seems to demonstrate that the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is indeed very strong and that it can positively impact state behavior. More specifically, the behavior of the United States, MERCOSUR, the OAS, and the Paraguayan people in the 1996 democratic crisis indicates that the principles and norms of democracy and interdependence have been internalized by the states, institutions, and individuals in the hemisphere. According to Ambassador Antonio Mercader of Uruguay,

The Paraguayan case is one more example of the current status of democracy as an uncontested political system and as the cardinal principle informing relations between states. It escapes no one that the traditional neutrality of the law of nations with respect to countries' internal affairs is giving way to what might be described as a social contract among states for the defense of democracy.¹⁹⁸

However, it is important to note that the Paraguay case is certainly not a perfect one. For example, the fact that the Colorado Party failed to react quickly to the crisis is still very troubling. This fact is not nearly as troubling though as the fact that General Oviedo was eventually officially cleared of all charges and was subsequently released from prison. The domestic internalization of these norms in Paraguay is thus not yet complete. Nevertheless, as Ambassador Carlos Víctor Montanaro of Paraguay has noted,

Although several aspects of our democracy fall short of perfection, we take pride in the progress made over this short period of time. Today we can point to a new, redesigned, reliable system for ensuring fair elections; a democratically elected congress, total freedom of expression; and a will

¹⁹⁶ Cynthia McClintock, “Globalization, Political Parties, and Communities: U.S. Policy and Peru's 2000 Elections,” paper prepared for delivery at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Hyatt Regency, Miami, March 16-18, 2000, p. 12.

¹⁹⁷ See Cynthia McClintock, “US Policy Towards the Fujimori Government in 2000: The Compromising of Democratic Standards for a Political Ally,” English Version of an Article Published in *Foreign Affairs en Español*, p. 6.

¹⁹⁸ Mercader, “The Reaction of MERCOSUR to the Institutional Crisis,” p. 3.

and a commitment on the part of the national government to press on with the strengthening of democracy.¹⁹⁹

The post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime can be characterized as very strong indeed because it was largely responsible for the peaceful resolution of the Paraguayan crisis of democracy in 1996. The Paraguayan people, of course, deserve much of the credit as well.

In the Peruvian case, on the other hand, the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime seemingly had less impact on state and individual behavior. In short, the Peru case illustrates many of the challenges discussed in Chapters II and III of this thesis, particularly the challenge of perceived national interests in the United States and Peru. Both had similar national interests in this regard, and democracy was not one of them. For example, economic aid to Peru was conditioned *not* on “democracy,” but on political and economic stability by any means necessary.²⁰⁰ The reason for this is because, as explained in Chapter III, economic issues have become increasingly important in the post-Cold War world. Consequently, it is important to the United States and the international financial community that Peru, and other Latin American countries for that matter, “continue to service their debts, to privatize state companies and welcome foreign investment, and to maintain stable national currencies.”²⁰¹ The “drug war” was another major U.S. interest in this regard. Concern with these national interests often superseded the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations in this case.

Even though the results of the Peru case study do not generally support the causal proposition regarding the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime, the case is still very enlightening. Much can be learned by the initial failure of this regime to impact state behavior in this case. In short, the regime failed at least three

¹⁹⁹ Carlos Víctor Montanero, “Opening Remarks,” *OAS Democratic Forum*, [<http://www.oas.org/information/ForoDemocratico/Paraguay/prgy2.htm>], p. 1, Accessed on January 25, 2003. Montanero was Permanent Representative of Paraguay to the OAS and Chairman of the Permanent Council at the time of the Democratic Forum.

²⁰⁰ For a critical analysis of conditioning aid to support and promote democracy, see Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, “The International Donor Community: Conditioned Aid and the Promotion and Defense of Democracy,” in Tom Farer, ed., pp. 169-186, *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

²⁰¹ McClintock, “Globalization, Political Parties, and Communities,” p. 11.

times in Peru. First, it failed in the immediate aftermath of the *autogolpe* in 1992. Second, it failed once again when the actors participating in the regime remained quiet regarding Fujimori's decision to run for a third and unprecedented presidential term. Finally, it failed yet once again by taking so long to react to the fraudulent election results in 2000. For example, regarding this latest failure, even though Fujimori's "one-man runoff" took place on May 28, 2000, the OAS did not *react* until late June.

In response to the democratic crisis in Peru, the OAS finally adopted Resolution 1753, "which sent a High-Level Mission led by Secretary General César Gaviria and Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy to Peru on June 27-30."²⁰² This resolution provided the pretext for subsequent democratic reforms, an interim transition government in November 2000, and a new round of elections in April 2001. Unlike in the Paraguay case, however, there was no threat of economic sanctions. Moreover, there was no interest in invoking Resolution 1080. Although electoral fraud is admittedly not a clear trigger for the invocation of Resolution 1080, neither is insubordination by a general officer (as in the Paraguay case). Nevertheless, "the representatives of Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela argued that Resolution 1080 did not apply to the Peruvian case."²⁰³

The most important lesson to be learned in the Peru case is the potential consequences of not adhering to the logic of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. This is an important lesson for nations to learn because, as Henry Kissinger has noted, "it is not often that nations learn from the past, even rarer still that they draw the correct conclusions from it."²⁰⁴ In short, Peru and the United States have learned their lessons regarding the logic of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime in the following ways. First, on November 20, 2000, Fujimori resigned his presidency via fax from Japan. However, "Congress rejected his resignation, removing him by declaring him 'morally unfit' for office."²⁰⁵ This move makes Fujimori ineligible to run for office in Peru again. Second, in 2001, new elections were held in

²⁰² Cooper and Ledgler, p. 123.

²⁰³ Cynthia McClintock, "The OAS in Peru: Room for Improvement," *Journal of Democracy*, 12, No. 4, (October 2001): p. 138.

²⁰⁴ Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 331.

²⁰⁵ Taft-Morales, p. 4.

Peru, and Alejandro Toledo, who withdrew from the runoff election with Fujimori in 2000 because he believed it to be unfair, won a run-off election with 53 percent of the vote. “The head of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission to Peru said that Peru did an ‘incredible job’ organizing ‘free and fair’ elections on June 3 that were an example for the rest of Latin America.”²⁰⁶ Finally, in the Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (P.L.106-429, Sec.530), the U.S. Congress directed the

Secretary of State to report every 90 days to Congress on whether Peru has made substantial progress in creating conditions for free and fair elections, and in respecting human rights, the rule of law, the independence and constitutional role of the judiciary and national congress, and freedom of expression and of the independent media. It prohibits assistance to Peru unless it has made substantial progress with respect to those goals. It also earmarks a minimum of \$2 million for the work of nongovernmental organizations and the OAS in promoting free and fair elections, democratic institutions, and human rights in Peru.²⁰⁷

In the final analysis, the Paraguay case is definitely the stronger case supporting the causal proposition. The Peru case is still very important though because it effectively demonstrates the potential challenges to the logic of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world. More importantly, the initial failure of the inter-American democracy regime in Peru has actually resulted in the strengthening of it based on very important lessons learned during the 2001 democratic crisis.

This chapter assessed the actual consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime within the context of the two case studies. The following chapter will address the potential consequences of this regime. More specifically, Chapter V will specifically answer the original research question posed in the introduction of this thesis.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the research question: *What are the actual and potential consequences of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world for the Western Hemisphere?* The actual consequences of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime have already been discussed in detail in Chapters III and IV. Consequently, this chapter will briefly summarize those arguments and then extrapolate from them in order to assess the potential consequences of this regime in the post-Cold War world for the Western Hemisphere. The plausibility of the emergence of a pluralistic security community based on the logic of this regime will be critically analyzed by considering the challenges most relevant to the inter-American system discussed in Chapter II. Moreover, the general strengths and weaknesses of Russett and Oneal's causal proposition will be critically analyzed and modifications to it will be suggested based on the lessons learned from the two case studies in this thesis. Finally, this chapter will conclude with some recommendations for future scholarly and policy relevant work on this subject.

A. THE ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME

The actual consequence of the inter-American democracy regime is a liberal, qualitative peace in the post-Cold War world for the Western Hemisphere. Chapter II specifically outlined the logic of this causal proposition. Chapter III described and explained the principles and norms of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime and how it differs from preceding regimes of cooperation in the hemisphere. Chapter IV employed the case study method in order to examine the strength of this regime and thus its actual consequences. In short, the Paraguay case study illustrates the potential effectiveness of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world. Paraguay continues to practice democracy today, which is a remarkable achievement considering its turbulent political history. The Peru case study is also significant because it illustrates some of the enduring challenges to the logic of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world. In this case, the regime was rendered less effective than in the Paraguay case because of the overwhelming domestic

support for Fujimori as well as the multiple and conflicted national interests of the United States and the international financial community. However, although the regime proved to be relatively weak in Peru in the 1990s, its long-term impact is already evident given the free and fair elections that followed the fraudulent elections of 2000.

Both case studies demonstrate that the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime matters because it can positively impact state behavior. Consequently, the nations of the inter-American system continue to work collectively in order to strengthen this regime. A recent example of this phenomenon was the OAS decision to invoke the *Inter-American Democratic Charter* in Venezuela last year. OAS members acted quickly to denounce the coup attempt. These actions represent significant changes in the dynamics of inter-American relations in the post-Cold War world.

B. THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRACY REGIME: FROM A “WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA” TO A “WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDENTITY?”

A potential consequence of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is that the Americas are plausibly on a path to the emergence of a pluralistic security community based on the logic of the three principles of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. The development of security communities is an evolutionary, path-dependent process. Since security communities evolve from path-dependent processes, their origins and paths will vary considerably.²⁰⁸ As noted in Chapter II, there are three tiers around which security communities are analytically organized: (1) precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and coordinate their policies; (2) structural elements of power and ideas, and the process elements of transactions, international organizations, and social learning; and (3) the reciprocal relationship between these other variables leads to the development of trust and collective identity formation.

In short, as previous chapters of this thesis demonstrate, the first two tiers are definitely applicable to the inter-American system. The end of the Cold War, and the resulting structural transformation of power, represents the first tier. The post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime itself represents the second tier. However, regarding

²⁰⁸ Adler and Barnett, p. 48.

the third tier, the “Western Hemisphere Idea” has not yet evolved into a “Western Hemisphere Identity.” Although there exist numerous shared norms and principles in the post-Cold War inter-American system, there are still some major obstacles to the development of a broad “Western Hemisphere Identity,” and thus to the emergence of a pluralistic security community. This conclusion will specifically identify three of the most relevant potential obstacles in this regard.

The first and most obvious potential obstacle is mutual trust. Given the historical legacy of inter-American relations, a genuine, reciprocal “we-feeling” may never develop in the Americas. However, in this context, the effects of a growing Hispanic population in the United States could potentially ameliorate some of this tension. Inherent to the mutual trust argument is the vast disparity in power between the United States and the rest of Latin America. For example, Gonzalez and Haggard (1998), in their analysis of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship, argue that no security community can emerge between two asymmetrical powers, such as the United States and Mexico, unless it is based on structural convergence- the extent to which the weaker party adopts policies that are conducive to the stronger party.²⁰⁹ This argument is not convincing though considering the fact that every bilateral or multilateral relationship in which the United States participates is essentially “asymmetrical.”

A second potential obstacle is perceived national interests. This has also been a recurring theme in the history of inter-American relations. It was particularly evident in the Peru case study, when the United States was more concerned with the drug war and the Shining Path than with Fujimori’s illiberal democracy. Perhaps the most critical issue in this regard is how the global “War on Terrorism” might affect U.S. national interests in Latin America in a post-9/11 world.

The final obstacle that will be discussed is the lack of democratic deepening in Latin America. According to Larry Diamond, the stability of democracy is intimately linked to its quality and authenticity; democracy cannot be consolidated in the region unless it is deepened and made more genuine for all of its citizens.²¹⁰ Since one would

²⁰⁹ See Gonzalez and Haggard, pp. 295-326

²¹⁰ Diamond, p. 53.

intuitively expect a positive correlation between the quality of a given state's democracy and the individual impact of these particular restraints on state behavior, the lack of democratic deepening in many Latin American countries represents a significant obstacle to the emergence of a security community in the Americas. However, a path to a security community certainly exists. Although the Western Hemisphere cannot yet be classified as a security community, the quality of peace has certainly evolved because of the strengthening of the inter-American democracy regime in the post-Cold War world. Thus, the strengthening of this regime has seemingly improved the prospects for the potential emergence of a security community in the Western Hemisphere in the twenty-first century.²¹¹

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary purpose of this thesis was to test Russett and Oneal's causal proposition regarding the individual and collective impact of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations on state behavior. The Paraguay case study represented a very strong test of this proposition. However, the Peru case study suggested additional intervening variables that affected state behavior that Russett and Oneal could not adequately describe nor explain. The limitations of Russett and Oneal's proposition in this context is that their proposition is primarily a systemic one. In short, by focusing only on the three very broad and related variables of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, the impact of other, perhaps less obvious, variables is potentially missed.

In the context of the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime, there are numerous variables that can potentially support or impede the further strengthening of this regime. Some of these variables are listed in Table V-I.

²¹¹ It is important to note that there are smaller security communities that already exist in the hemisphere such as U.S.-Canada and Argentina-Brazil-Chile. Moreover, the U.S.-Canada-Mexico relationship seems to be becoming one as well.

Level of Analysis	Supporting	Impeding
Systemic Variables	Democracy Interdependence International Organizations	Balance of Power Strategic Interests
Sub-systemic Variables	Internalization of Norms Civil Society Strong Leadership	Lack of Democratic Deepening Nationalism Weak leadership Poverty/Underdevelopment Globalization (Backlash)

Table V-I. Variables Supporting/Impeding Inter-American Democracy Regime.

Table V-I obviously does not represent an exhaustive list of all the variables that could be relevant in a given case. The purpose of Table V-I is to illustrate the complexity of factors potentially accounting for the dependent variable.²¹² Democracy, interdependence, and international organizations cannot explain everything. The limitations of Russett and Oneal's proposition is that they fail to adequately consider these sub-systemic variables in their analysis.

1. Scholarly Recommendations

In addition to incorporating sub-systemic variables in to Russett and Oneal's proposition when relevant, this thesis has one specific scholarly recommendation: more case studies. Since the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime is just over a decade old, more case studies are needed in order to accurately assess its significance. Case studies that vary across different U.S. presidential administrations would be particularly useful. For example, the case studies critically examined in this thesis both occurred during the Clinton Administration. A detailed analysis of the attempted coup in Venezuela last year, which occurred during the George W. Bush Administration, could

²¹² It is important to note that many of the challenges to Russett and Oneal's proposition discussed in Chapter II are listed in Table V-I as "sub-systemic variables."

be particularly helpful in understanding why the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime had such little impact on U.S. behavior in that specific case.²¹³

2. Policy Recommendations

In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that, in the post-Cold War world, the Western Hemisphere is evidence of a liberal, qualitative peace. This peace is contingent on the mutually reinforcing dynamics of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. These three principles constitute the post-Cold War inter-American democracy regime, and the further strengthening of this regime has improved the prospects for the potential emergence of a pluralistic security community in the Americas in the twenty-first century.

However, the path to a genuine pluralistic security community of democracies is mined with many obstacles. For example, the Peru case study illustrates that electoral fraud is a significant threat to democracy in the post-Cold War world. In fact, considering the strong principles and norms that constitute the inter-American democracy regime (specifically those outlined in Resolution 1080 and the *Inter-American Democratic Charter*) electoral fraud is probably a more significant threat to democracy than a traditional military coup in the post-Cold War inter-American system. The Peru case study illustrates the significance of this threat. Although democracy is much more than just “elections,” elections are fundamental. Therefore, one specific policy recommendation in this regard is the further strengthening of Resolution 1080 to ensure legitimate and credible elections in the hemisphere. More specifically, “Resolution 1080 should be modified to require OAS action in the case of an election deemed fraudulent by an OAS observation mission.”²¹⁴ Defining democracy is inherently troublesome. However, defining what it is not is necessary in order to perpetuate the inter-American community of democracies well into the twenty-first century.

This will all require truly inspired leadership and statesmanship, in both North and South America. The Americas have an historic opportunity to finally bridge the gap between the rhetoric of the “Western Hemisphere Idea” and the reality of it. Admittedly,

²¹³ The United States did not initially recognize the case as an attempted coup and it was the only member of the OAS to take that position.

²¹⁴ Cynthia McClintock, “Room for Improvement,” p. 140.

the tasks of the post-Cold War inter-American agenda are great; but, as “Americans,” our expectations should be even greater. In short, history will not excuse failure based on the magnitude of these tasks. In the inspiring words of Dr. Henry Kissinger, “for men become myths, not by what they know, nor even by what they achieve, but by the tasks they set for themselves.”²¹⁵ The same can be said about nation-states. History will soon reveal the destiny of “the Americas” in this regard.

²¹⁵ Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 322.

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